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The wide spread use of networking and internet has led to remarkable research 
efforts in the area of information security. This thesis is to develop new 
techniques for optical image encryption, and to overcome some existing 
problems in conventional cryptosystems. 
To improve the double random phase encryption (DRPE) technique, a 
new image encryption technique that utilizes the compressive sensing concept 
along with DRPE is proposed. A space multiplexing method can be further 
employed to encrypt multiple images. The method, which results in a 
nonlinear encryption system, is able to overcome the vulnerability of 
conventional DRPE.  
To avoid an interferometric scheme in conventional photon-counting 
DRPE (PC-DRPE) techniques, a PC-DRPE technique that only requires the 
photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted image for decryption is proposed. 
Both the encryption and decryption processes are simplified since complex 
amplitude recording of the encrypted image, such as in an interferometric 
setup, is not needed. 
For security analysis of asymmetric cryptosystems, an improved 
method of attack on an asymmetric cryptosystem based on phase-truncated 
Fourier transform (PTFT) is proposed. Compared with existing methods, the 
performance of the proposed method is very much enhanced. Based on the 
proposed method of attack, a new and improved cryptosystem is further 
proposed. In addition, a cryptanalysis of an asymmetric cryptosystem based on 
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vi 
equal modulus decomposition is presented. It is shown that the system is 
vulnerable to a newly designed attack. A corresponding security enhanced 
asymmetric cryptosystem is also proposed. The improvement significantly 
enhances the security of the system. 
A novel optical image encryption approach by integrating PC 
technique and ghost imaging is proposed. Different from the conventional 
cryptosystems based on random phase encryption, this security system 
encrypts image into an intensity vector. PC imaging follows the Poisson 
distribution which is a nonlinear transformation unlike the conventional ghost-
imaging-based encryption which is linear. In this case, an additional protection 
is provided to the proposed security system and may make the system more 
robust against attacks. 
It can be concluded that the proposed techniques in this thesis have 
provided solutions to overcome some existing problems in the field of optical 
image encryption. The research work in this thesis may contribute to develop 
more secured optical image encryption techniques, and may also shed some 
light on further development of optical security systems in practical 
applications.
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Schematic of DRPE. M1 and M2, random phase masks. 
 
(a) Encryption process of DRPE; (b) decryption process of 
DRPE. 
 
(a) Original image; (b) amplitude of the encrypted image; (c) 
photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted image with pN  = 
103 (0.0152 photons/pixel); (d) decrypted images with pN  = 
103; (e) nonlinear correlation result. 
 
Schematic of optical image encryption based on diffractive 
imaging. 
 
(a) Original image; (b)–(d) three recorded diffraction 
intensity maps; (e) the decrypted image (22 iterations); (f) 
the curve of iterative error during decryption. 
 
Flowchart of  (a) the encryption process and (b) decryption 
process. 
 
Schematic representation of equal modulus decomposition. 
 
(a) flowchart of the encryption process; (b) schematic setup 
for the decryption process. 
 
Schematic setup for decryption process. 
 
(a) original image; (c) phase distribution of mask 1M ; (d) 
phase distribution of mask 2M ; (d) a decrypted image using 
only 1M ; (b) a decrypted image using only 2M . 
 
A schematic setup for ghost imaging. SLM, spatial light 
modulator; BSC, beam splitter cube. 
 
(a) Original image; (b) a series of 1D intensity points as 
ciphertexts; (c) reconstructed image using correct security 
keys; (d) reconstructed image using wrong security keys. 
The number of measurements is 5000, i.e., M = 5000. 
 
Proposed encryption setup 
 
Proposed decryption setup 
































































































Simulated results using the proposed method. (a–d) Images 
before encryption (256×256); (e–h) sampled image data after 
compressive sampling (128×128); (i) single synthesized 
image after space multiplexing (256×256); (j) encrypted 
image after DRPE (256×256). 
 
Decrypted images (256×256) with (a) CC = 0.9933 (b) CC = 
0.9968 (c) CC = 1.0 and (d) CC = 0.9951. 
 
Robustness check of proposed system to the deployment of 
wrong DRPE keys. (a)–(d) Decrypted images with wrong 
first phase mask key (a) CC = 0.0198 (b) CC = 0.0286 (c) 
CC = 0.0123 and (d) CC = 0.0132; (e)–(h) decrypted images 
with wrong second phase mask key (e) C = 0.0049 (f) CC = 
0.0044 (g) CC = 0.0071 and (h) CC = 0.0045. 
 
Decrypted images with wrong binary keys (a) CC = 0.0397, 
(b) CC = 0.044 (c) CC = 0.0059 and (d) CC = 0.0243; (e) 
plot showing correlation value against resemblance 
percentage of the partially incorrect binary keys used with 
correct binary masks. 
 
Effect of sampling ratio on decrypted images. (a1)–(a4) 
Decrypted images for sampling ratio 16.66% (a1) CC = 
0.9891 (a2) CC = 0.9947 (a3) CC = 0.9984 and (a4) CC = 
0.9926; (b1)–(b4) decrypted images for sampling ratio 10% 
(b1) CC = 0.9826 (b2) CC = 0.9912 (b3) CC = 0.9919 and 
(b4) CC = 0.9884; (c1)–(c4) decrypted images for sampling 
ratio 4% (c1) CC = 0.9668 (c2) CC = 0.9796 (c3) CC = 
0.9610 and (c4) CC = 0.9756. 
 
Plot showing correlation against sampling ratio R. 
 
Robustness of proposed system against plaintext attacks. (a) 
Plaintext P1; (b) plaintext P2; (c) ciphertext C1; (d) 
ciphertext C2; (e) difference between ciphertexts C1 and C2; 
(f) actual (Fourier) phase mask used for encryption; (g) 
decrypted image using incorrect plaintext attack key, CC = 
0.0024; (h) encrypted Dirac Delta function using proposed 
method. 
 
Flowchart for the proposed optical encryption and 
verification system. 
 
(a) Binary input image; (b) amplitude of the encrypted image 
using the amplitude-based DRPE, | ( ) |A xψ ; (c) photon-




































































































= 3×104 or 0.4578 photons/pixel; (d) decrypted image 
without the phase of encrypted image, with pN  = 3×10
4 or 
0.4578 photons/pixel; (e) decrypted image without the phase 
of encrypted image, with pN  = 10
6 or 15.2588 
photons/pixel. 
 
(a) Gray-scale input image; (b) amplitude of the encrypted 
image using the amplitude-based DRPE, | ( ) |A xψ ; (c) 
photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted image, | ( ) |A xx , 
with pN  = 2×10
4 or 0.3052 photons/pixel; (d) decrypted 
image without the phase of encrypted image, with pN  = 
2×104 or 0.3052 photons/pixel; (e) decrypted image without 
the phase of encrypted image, with pN  = 10
6 or 15.2588 
photons/pixel. 
 
Peak to correlation energy (PCE) versus number of photons 
( pN ) for different nonlinearities (k) for (a) a binary input 
image and (b) a gray-scale input image using the amplitude-
based encryption. 
 
(a) Photon-limited decrypted binary images with pN  = 
3×104 or 0.4578 photons/pixel; (b) nonlinear correlation 
results using k = 0.3 and the image shown in Fig. 3.11(a) as 
the reference image. The phase unknown correlation is 
normalized relative to the phase known correlation. 
 
(a) Photon-limited decrypted gray-scale images with pN  = 
2×104 or 0.3052 photons/pixel; (b) nonlinear correlation 
results using k = 0.3 and the image shown in Fig. 3.12(a) as 
the reference image. The phase unknown correlation is 
normalized relative to the phase known correlation. 
 
(a) Photon-limited decrypted binary images with pN  = 10
3 
or 0.0152 photons/pixel; (b) nonlinear correlation results 
using k = 0.3 and the image shown in Fig. 3.11(a) as the 
reference image. The phase unknown correlation is 
normalized relative to the phase known correlation. 
 
(a) Photon-limited decrypted gray-scale images with pN  = 
7×103 or 0.1068 photons/pixel; (b) nonlinear correlation 
results using k = 0.3 and the image shown in Fig. 3.12(a) as 
the reference image. The phase unknown correlation is 


































































































Nonlinear correlation result between recov ( )xφ  and ( )xψφ . (a) 
recov ( )xφ  is generated from correct phase masks; (b) recov ( )xφ  
is generated from wrong phase masks. 
 
Photon-limited decrypted binary images when (a) a(x) or (b) 
b(µ) is incorrect during the decoding; (c)–(d) nonlinear 
correlation results respectively corresponding to the 
decrypted images in (a)–(b). 
 
(a) False class binary image; (b) photon-limited decrypted 
image using the proposed method with pN  = 3×10
4 or 
0.4578 photons/pixel; (c) nonlinear correlation results using 
k = 0.3 and the image shown in Fig. 3.11(a) as the reference 
image. 
 
(a) Photon-limited decrypted images when the photon-
limited amplitude of the encrypted images with pN  = 3×10
4 
or 0.4578 photons/pixel is contaminated by Gaussian noise 
(a) with a standard deviation of 0.1; (b) with a standard 
deviation of 0.2; (c)–(d) nonlinear correlation results 
respectively corresponding to the decrypted images in (a)–
(b). 
 
(a) Photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted images with 
pN  = 3×10
4 or 0.4578 photons/pixel contaminated by (a) a 
10% occlusion; (b) a 25% occlusion; (c)–(d) photon-limited 
decrypted images from the photon-limited amplitude of the 
encrypted images shown in (a)–(b); (e)–(f) nonlinear 
correlation results respectively corresponding to the 
decrypted images in (c)–(d). 
 
Photon-limited decrypted binary images with pN  = 5×10
3 or 
0.0763 photons/pixel for the (a) amplitude-based encryption, 
and (b) the full-phase encryption; (c)–(d) nonlinear 
correlation results respectively corresponding to the 
decrypted images in (a)–(b). The results cannot be applied to 
a gray-scale image. 
 
Peak to correlation energy (PCE) versus number of photons 
( pN ) for k = 0.3 for a binary image. The results cannot be 
applied to a gray-scale image. 
 
A flow chart of an attack process. 
 





































































































(a) Grayscale original image; (b) binary original image; (c) 
RPM1; (d) RPM2; (e) encrypted image from (a); (f) 
encrypted image from (b). 
 
(a) Retrieved grayscale images corresponding to different 
number of iterations: (a) 50; (b) 200. Retrieved binary 
images corresponding to different number of iterations: (c) 
50; (d) 102. 
 
Relation between MSE values and iteration numbers using 
different attack methods: (a) MSE values of grayscale 
image; (b) MSE values of binary image. Relation between 
CC values and iteration numbers using different attack 
methods: (c) CC values of grayscale image; (d) CC values of 
binary image. 
 
(a) Retrieved grayscale image with the minimum value of 
MSE in a specific attack; (b) retrieved binary image with 
200 iterations in a specific attack; (c) retrieved grayscale 
image with 200 iterations in a new method of attack; (d) 
retrieved binary image with 200 iterations in a new method 
of attack. 
 
(a) CC values against different Gaussian noises in a 
grayscale image using different methods of attack; (b) CC 
values against different Gaussian noises in a binary image 
using different methods of attack. 
 
Decrypted grayscale images from a noisy ciphertext with a 
standard deviation of 0.06: (a) in proposed method of attack, 
(b) new method of attack and (c) specific method of attack; 
decrypted binary images from a noisy ciphertext with a 
standard deviation of 0.06 (d) in proposed method of attack, 
(e) new method of attack and (f) specific method of attack. 
 
(a) CC values against different occlusions in a grayscale 
image; (b) CC values against different occlusions in a binary 
image. 
 
Decrypted grayscale images of a ciphertext with a 6% 
occlusion: (a) in proposed method of attack, (b) new method 
of attack and (c) specific method of attack; decrypted binary 
images of a ciphertext with a 6% occlusion: (d) in proposed 
method of attack, (e) new method of attack and (f) specific 
method of attack. 
 
Flow chart of proposed encryption process. 
 





































































































RPM2; (b) decrypted image using an incorrect RPM1 and the 
actual RPM2. 
 
Schematic representation of equal modulus decomposition. 
 
(a) A gray-scale original image; (b) a binary original image; 
(c) function R(x, y); (d) function ( , )u vθ ; (e) real part of an 
encrypted image of (a); (f) real part of an encrypted image of 
(b). 
 
(a) Relation between MSE values and iteration numbers for 
a gray-scale image; (b) retrieved gray-scale image with an 
iteration number of 100. 
 
(a) Relation between MSE values and iteration numbers for 
a binary image; (b) retrieved binary image with an iteration 
number of 100. 
 
Schematic representation of random decomposition. 
 
Proposed asymmetric cryptosystem based on random 
decomposition and 4-f system: (a) a flowchart of the 
encryption process; (b) schematic setup of the optical 
decryption process. 
 
(a) Ciphertext 3( , )P x y  (real part); (b) private key 2 ( , )P x y  
(real part); (c) private key 1( , )P u v  (real part); (d) decrypted 
image. 
 
(a) Decrypted image using an incorrect 2 ( , )P x y  function; (b) 
decrypted image using an incorrect 1( , )P u v  function. 
 
(a) Known-plaintext attack on the proposed system; (b) a 
retrieved image after 300 iterations; (c) relation between 
MSE values and iteration numbers. 
 
(a) Decrypted image using mask 1( , )P u v ; (b) decrypted 
image using mask 2 ( , )P x y ; (c) decrypted image using mask 
3( , )P x y ; (d) decrypted image using masks 1( , )P u v  and 
2 ( , )P x y ; (e) decrypted image using masks 1( , )P u v  and 
3( , )P x y ; (f) decrypted image using masks 2 ( , )P x y  and 
3( , )P x y . 
 
Ciphertexts contaminated by Gaussian noise with a standard 
deviation of (a) 0.1; (b) 0.2; (c) decrypted image of 




































































































shown in (b). 
 
(a) Ciphertext with a 10% occlusion; (b) ciphertext with a 
20% occlusion; (c) decrypted image of ciphertext shown in 
(a); (d) decrypted image of ciphertext shown in (b). 
 
A schematic setup for ghost imaging. Only the object beam 
arm is illustrated and the intensity patterns at the reference 
beam arm are virtually computed. SLM, spatial light 
modulator. 
 
(a) Original object; (b) ciphertext; (c) photon-limited 
ciphertext with pN =100 photons (0.033 photons/pixel); (d) 
histogram of the ciphertext; (e) histogram of the photon-
limited ciphertext. 
 
(a) Decoded object; (b) nonlinear correlation result using k = 
0.3 and Fig. 5.2(a) as the reference object. 
 
PCE value versus number of photons for different 
nonlinearities (k). The values and uncertainty bars are 
established by running 20 simulations and taking the mean 
value and the standard deviation, respectively. 
 
(a) Reconstructed object using wrong keys with pN =100 
and M=3000; (b) nonlinear correlation result using k = 0.3 
and Fig. 5.2(a) as the reference object. The correlation is 
normalized relative to the correct case in Fig. 5.3(b). 
 
(a) False object; (b) reconstructed object with pN =100 and 
M=3000; (c) nonlinear correlation result using k = 0.3 and 
Fig. 6.2(a) as the reference object. The correlation is 
normalized relative to the correct case in Fig. 5.3(b). 
 
Reconstructed objects with pN =100 and M=3000 when the 
secret key components are partially recovered for different 
eavesdropping percentages: (a) 30%, (b) 50%, (c) 60%, (d) 
70%. 
 
Nonlinear correlation results respectively corresponding to 
Figs. 5.7(a)–(d). The correlation is normalized relative to the 
correct case in Fig. 5.3(b). 
 
Decoded objects when the number of measurements 
M=20000 with (a) number of photons pN =1000 (0.05 
photons/pixel) and (b) pN =5000 (0.25 photons/pixel); (c)–

































































respectively corresponding to Figs. 5.9(a) and (b).  
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1.1   Information security 
With the wide use of internet and networking, millions of transactions of 
sensitive information are performed every day ranging from the exchange of 
credit card information to using a passport for identification. Ensuring the 
safety of the sensitive information being exchanged is important. Each year, 
billions of dollars are spent on prevention of information fraud, including 
credit cards forgery. Although the public is largely unaware of it, scientists 
have been developing various encryption techniques in order to protect 
important information, especially in data transmission. For example, credit 
cards contain a holographic image in order to make it difficult to duplicate. In 
addition to physical duplication of sensitive information, many transactions of 
sensitive information are also passed through the internet and possible 
insecure networks. If attackers were to intercept this data, they will have the 
opportunity to steal this information. Whether it is the electronic transmission 
of credit card information or passport numbers, the protection of this 
information is important. Currently some encryption algorithms have been 
proposed to secure electronic communication, such as the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES), which is a symmetric algorithm meaning that the 
encryption and decryption keys are identical [1]. Moreover, there is the 
Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) algorithm, which is a public-key 
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cryptography meaning there is a public key and an associated private key used 
in the encryption/decryption process [2]. 
Optical technologies for information security have attracted increasing 
attention in the last few decades due to marked characteristics, such as parallel 
processing and multidimensional capabilities [3, 4]. One of the most popular 
optical image encryption techniques, namely, double random phase encryption 
(DRPE), was first introduced by Refregier and Javidi [5]. Since the work of 
DRPE, remarkable research efforts on optical encryption have been initiated 
[5–11]. According to the pioneering work proposed by Javidi, the main 
advantages of optical encryption techniques are: (1) Optical instruments have 
an inherent capability for parallel processing. All the pixels of an image can be 
processed at the same time. In contrast, the electronic counterparts are mostly 
limited to a serial processing and the ones and zeros denoting the presence or 
absence of a pixel have to be processed one bit at a time. Hence, when there is 
a large volume of information to be processed, electronic counterparts can be 
time consuming. Optical hardware is able to process a two-dimensional (2D) 
array of data at several hundred frames per second which is at least an order of 
magnitude higher than that of the electronic counterparts. (2) Besides the rapid 
transmission of information, optical encryption methods also provide a higher 
security level than that of its electronic counterparts. In the optical image 
encryption system, important information can be encrypted in multiple 
dimensions, such as wavelength, phase, and polarization. In addition, in the 
optical cryptosystem, an 8-bit or above optical system can provide each pixel 
with higher grey-scale qualities, rather than merely the ones and zeros encoded 
in the electronic counterparts. (3) Before an attacker can even begin the 
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laborious process of decoding an image, one has to gain access to the 
sophisticated optoelectronic devices and systems. In a typical optical system, it 
consists of optical devices, such as a light source, lenses, mirrors, beam 
splitters, detectors, and spatial light modulators (SLMs). Various optical 
experimental setups can be designed and conducted. In addition, with a 
combination of various pre- and post-processing techniques, the optical 
cryptosystem will become highly complicated and difficult for the attackers. 
However, with an authorized receiver, it can be decrypted with the knowledge 
of correct security keys. 
 
1.2   Optical image encryption  
Among the optical image encryption technologies, DRPE, in which an input 
image is encrypted into a stationary white noise using two random phase 
masks located at the input plane and Fourier plane, is the most widely used [5]. 
However, the DRPE technique is a linear and symmetric cryptosystem, in 
which the encryption and decryption keys are identical. Due to the linear and 
symmetric properties in the conventional DRPE technique, it has been shown 
that the technique is vulnerable to attacks [12–17], such as chosen-plaintext 
and chosen-ciphertext attacks. It is thus desired to develop nonlinear 
cryptosystems to enhance the security of the DRPE technique. 
To overcome the vulnerability of a linear symmetric cryptosystem, an 
asymmetric cryptosystem based on a phase-truncated Fourier transform (PTFT) 
using nonlinear phase truncation was proposed [18]. This produces a real-
value ciphertext with two public keys and a user is able obtain the original 
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image with two private keys. Due to the nonlinearity of phase truncation, the 
encryption system is able to achieve a high degree of robustness against 
attacks that DRPE systems are vulnerable to. However, it is found vulnerable 
to some phase retrieval attacks [19, 20]. In 2015, an asymmetric cryptosystem 
based on equal modulus decomposition (EMD), which is robust against an 
iterative amplitude-phase retrieval attack, has also been proposed [21]. 
Although asymmetric cryptosystems are immune to attacks that other DRPE 
cryptosystems are vulnerable to, their reliability and security need to be 
investigated. 
Optical image encryption based on interference has attracted wide 
attention in recent years [22]. This method encrypts an image into two phase-
only masks using interference principle. An iterative algorithm is not needed 
in this technique. However, there is a silhouette (partial recognizable 
information) problem in the interference-based cryptosystem: a silhouette of 
the original image can be reconstructed using any one of the generated phase-
only masks, which could be considered as system deficiency [23]. Methods, 
which require post-processing of the phase-only masks or time-consuming 
iterative algorithm, have been proposed for silhouette removal. It is thus 
desirable that an easy and straightforward method can be developed to remove 
the silhouette in the interference-based cryptosystem. 
Ghost imaging has drawn wide attention recently owing to its 
remarkable characteristics [24–28]. In ghost imaging, the object can be 
retrieved using two spatially correlated beams. The applications based on 
ghost imaging have been extensively explored, such as remote sensing [29]. 
Recently, optical encryption based on ghost imaging has been proposed [30]. 
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Ghost imaging provides an interesting research perspective for optical security 
and effectively enriches conventional optical security field. Different from the 
optical security system based on random-phase encryption, ghost-imaging-
based security system encrypts an image into an intensity vector, rather than a 
complex-valued matrix, which is more convenience in optical implementation, 
data transmission and storage. However, since the ghost-imaging-based 
security system is a linear system, it has been recently shown to be vulnerable 
to a chosen-plaintext attack [31]. Thus, it is expected that a nonlinear system 
can be developed to enhance the security of the ghost-imaging-based security 
system. 
 
1.3   Scope and outline of the thesis 
Although optical image encryption techniques have gained rapid development, 
there are still considerable concerns and challenges on the development of 
optical image encryption techniques to meet higher requirements for practical 
applications. The concerns and challenges are summarized as follows: (1) the 
conventional linear cryptosystems have been shown vulnerable to some types 
of attacks, thus there is increasing focus on research activities on devising 
nonlinear cryptosystems. (2) Although some asymmetric cryptosystems have 
been proposed to overcome the linearity problem in the DRPE technique, their 
reliability and security are needed to be investigated. (3) The interference-
based cryptosystem suffers a silhouette problem: a silhouette of the original 
image can be reconstructed using any one of the generated phase-only masks. 
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(4) Due to the linearity of the ghost-imaging-based security system, it has been 
shown to be vulnerable to a chosen-plaintext attack. 
The objectives of this research work are to develop new optical image 
encryption techniques, and to overcome the existing problems in conventional 
cryptosystems. These objectives are summarized as follows: (1) To develop 
nonlinear cryptosystems and enhance the security robustness in conventional 
DRPE technique. (2) To evaluate the security of asymmetric cryptosystems 
and develop corresponding improvement to the original cryptosystems. (3) To 
develop a new interference-based cryptosystem which would be able to 
resolved the silhouette problem. (4) To develop a nonlinear cryptosystem 
based on ghost imaging to enhance the security robustness in conventional 
ghost-imaging-based cryptosystem. A list of publications arising from this 
research work is included in the Appendix. The research work in this thesis 
would contribute to the development of more secured optical image encryption 
techniques, and would also shed some light on the further development of 
optical security systems in practical applications. 
The thesis is organized into six chapters. 
In Chapter 1, a brief introduction of information security and optical 
image encryption is given. In addition, some existing challenges in optical 
image encryption are described. The objectives and significance of this 
research work are also presented. 
In Chapter 2, a literature review is conducted. Different optical image 
encryption techniques, i.e., DRPE, asymmetric cryptosystems, interference-
based optical image encryption, multiple-image encryption and ghost-
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imaging-based security system, are reviewed. The advantages and 
disadvantages of different cryptosystems are also discussed. 
In Chapter 3, improvements on DRPE are presented. This chapter 
contains two parts. In the first part, an improved encryption method that uses 
the compressive sensing with DRPE is presented. In the second part, a photon-
counting DRPE technique that only requires the photon-limited amplitude of 
the encrypted image for decryption is presented. 
In Chapter 4, new methods of attack on asymmetric cryptosystems 
based on PTFT and EMD are presented. In addition, corresponding improved 
cryptosystems with good security enhancement are also presented. 
In Chapter 5, a novel optical image encryption using photon counting 
technique and ghost imaging is presented. 
In Chapter 6, the findings of this study are concluded, and research 
directions for further study are recommended. 









2.1   Double random phase encryption (DRPE) 
DRPE is a popular optical encryption method due to its simplicity [5]. In 
DRPE, an original image is encrypted into a noise-like image using the setup 
shown in Fig. 2.1. Let ( , )f x y  denote an original image, a(x, y) and b(v) 
denote two statistically independent noises uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. The 
encrypted image, ( , )x y , is given as [5] 
 
( , ) { ( , )exp[ 2 ( , )]} ( , ),x y f x y i a x y h x y                                                (2.1) 
 
where   denotes convolution, and h(x, y) is a function whose Fourier 
transform is exp[ 2 ( , )]i b v  . 
 
 
Fig. 2.1  Schematic of DRPE. M1 and M2, random phase masks. 
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During decryption, a Fourier transform of ( , )x y  is taken and it is 
then multiplied by the complex conjugate of the random phase mask in the 
frequency domain of the encryption process, exp[ 2 ( , )]i b v  . An inverse 
Fourier transform is then performed to obtain the function 
( , )exp[ 2 ( , )]f x y i a x y . A CCD camera will recover the decrypted image as 
2| ( , ) |f x y , which is equivalent to ( , )f x y  since the image is positive. 
 
FT IFT












Fig. 2.2  (a) Encryption process of DRPE; (b) decryption process of DRPE. 
  
Figure 2.2(a) shows the encryption process of DRPE. The original 
image is encrypted into a noise-like image. No useful information on the 
original image can be observed after encryption. Figure 2.2(b) shows the 
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decryption process of DRPE. The random phase mask M2 acts as a decryption 
key, the image decrypted using a wrong decryption key is shown in Fig. 2.2(b). 
When DRPE is conducted in the Fourier domain, only phase mask M2 is used 
as the security key. Hence, the key space is relatively limited. Different 
encoding domains, such as Fresnel transform [6–8], and fractional Fourier 
transform [9–11], have been further developed to improve the system 
performance since system parameters (such as the fractional order and the 
propagation distance) can serve as additional secret keys.  
Evaluating the security of optical cryptosystems has also become a 
concern because an optical cryptosystem is secure only if it is immune to 
various attacks. In 2005, Carnicer et al. first showed that DRPE was 
vulnerable to a chosen-ciphertext attack [12]. Thereafter, a known-plaintext 
attack on DRPE scheme using an iterative phase retrieval algorithm is 
proposed [13]. Meanwhile, DRPE in Fresnel domain was shown to be 
vulnerable to a chosen-plaintext attack [14] and in 2009, Qin et al. proposed a 
known-plaintext attack on DRPE in fractional Fourier domain [16]. 
The vulnerability of DRPE arises from its linearity. Many approaches 
have been proposed to enhance the security of the DRPE scheme, however 
their reliability and security are needed to be investigated. For example, a 
double random phase-amplitude encryption (DRPAE) method was proposed to 
remove the linearity of DRPE by adding an amplitude mask in 2008 [32]. 
However, He and Peng proposed a method of attack that combines a known-
plaintext and a chosen-plaintext attacks to retrieve the security keys of 
DRPAE method [33]. Kumar et al. showed that this method was also a linear 
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system and an attacker could retrieve the decryption keys by using a point 
spread function [34]. 
 
2.2   DRPE with photon-counting 
Recently, a photon-counting (PC) technique has been integrated with the 
DRPE technique for encryption and security verification [35–40]. The 
motivation is to combine the photon counting technique and the DRPE 
technique to provide an additional security layer against attacks. PC technique 
has been widely used in many fields [41, 42]. In PC imaging systems, the 
number of photons that arrive at a pixel can be controlled through a stochastic 
Poisson process. A sparse encrypted image is obtained by limiting the number 
of photons. As a result, the corresponding decrypted image does not reveal the 
original information. However, the decrypted image can be further 
authenticated using correlation algorithms [43–45]. 
The photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted image can be obtained 
by limiting the number of photons in the scene, pN , using a PC imaging 
approach [36–40]. This process is assumed to be a Poisson distribution [46, 

















     0,1,2jL                                                           (2.2) 
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where j  is the Poisson parameter defined as ( )p jN g x  where ( )jg x  is the 





  with M being the 
total number of pixels. 
 
   
(a)                           (b)                           (c) 
   
(d)                                   (e) 
Fig. 2.3  (a) Original image; (b) amplitude of the encrypted image; (c) photon-
limited amplitude of the encrypted image with pN  = 10
3
 (0.0152 
photons/pixel); (d) decrypted images with pN  = 10
3
; (e) nonlinear 
correlation result, units of horizontal and vertical axes are “pixels” 
and “a.u.”, respectively. 
 
The decryption process of the DRPE is then used. A binary image [Fig. 
2.3(a)] of size 256 × 256 pixels is used as the original input image. Figure 
2.3(b) shows the amplitude of the encrypted image of DRPE. Figure 2.3(c) 
shows the photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted image with pN  = 10
3
 
photons. Figure 2.3(d) shows the decrypted image. No useful information can 
be observed from the decrypted image. To authenticate the PC decrypted 
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image, the decrypted image is correlated with the original image using a kth-
law nonlinear correlation with k = 0.3 [35–40]. The corresponding nonlinear 
correlation result is shown in Fig. 2.3(e). It is seen from Fig. 2.3(e) that only 
one remarkable peak is produced at the center over the noisy background, 
which means the photon-counting decrypted image can be successfully 
verified. Compared with DRPE, PC-DRPE makes the encryption process 
nonlinear and provides an additional protection without observation of original 
image. 
 
2.3   Optical encryption based on diffractive imaging 
In the DRPE technique, the accurate extraction of the complex encrypted 
image is necessary. An interferometric scheme, such as holography [48–50], is 
commonly employed to record the complex encrypted image. As a result, the 
encryption architecture is complicated and high stability is required. Recently, 
Chen et al. [51–54] proposed a new optical encryption technique based on 
diffractive imaging. 
Figure 2.4 shows a schematic setup of diffractive-imaging-based 
encryption using multiple intensity recording with axial translation of a CCD. 






( 1) 1 2( , ) FrT {{FrT [ ( , ) ( , )]} ( , )]} ,
h
d d h dI f x y M x y M v                      (2.3) 
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where ( ) ( , )hI   (h=1, 2, 3) denotes the recorded diffraction intensity patterns. 
( , )f x y  denotes the input image (plaintext), 1M  and 2M  are the random 
phase masks, 
1d  and 2d  are axial distances, d  is the CCD camera translation, 
and FrT denotes wave propagation in the Fresnel domain [55–57].  
 
M1 M2
d1 d2 CCD translation
 
Fig. 2.4  Schematic of optical image encryption based on diffractive imaging. 
 
During decryption, a phase retrieval algorithm is used. Three recorded 
diffraction intensity maps are used as examples to illustrate the principle of 
decryption process. Let ( ) ( , )nf x y  denote the estimation of the plaintext. The 
iterative algorithm is described as follows: 
1. The estimation of the plaintext ( ) ( , )nf x y  is propagated forward to 
the first CCD plane: 
 
2 1
( ) ( )
( 1) 1 2( , ) FrT {{FrT [ ( , ) ( , )]} ( , )]},
n n
d d h dO f x y M x y M v                     (2.4) 
 
where n = 1 and h = 1 are used at initial step. 
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2. The recorded intensity ( ) ( , )hI    is used as constraint to replace the 
amplitude of obtained ( ) ( , )nO   : 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ( , ) ( , ) [ ( , ) | ( , ) |].n h n nO I O O                                                 (2.5) 
 




( ) ( ) * *
[ ( 1)] 2 2
ˆ ˆ( , ) FrT {{FrT [ ( , ) ( , )]} ( , )]},n nd d d hf x y O M v M x y                  (2.6) 
 
where asterisk denotes complex conjugate. The amplitude of ( )ˆ ( , )nf x y  is 
subsequently employed as a new estimate for the plaintext. The next ciphertext 
(i.e., h = h+1) and the next CCD position [i.e., 2 ( 1)d d h   ] are employed 
until h = 3. When the three recordings are processed, one iteration is 
completed. The number of iterations employed is determined by an iterative 
error: 
 
( ) ( 1) 2
,
ˆ ˆIE [| ( , ) | | ( , ) |] .n n
x y
f x y f x y                                                            (2.7) 
 
When the error reaches a threshold value, the iteration process is stopped. The 
amplitude of ( )ˆ ( , )nf x y  is regarded as a decrypted image. 
Figure 2.5(a) shows the original image. Figures 2.5(b)–(d) show three 
recorded intensity maps. Figure 2.5(e) shows a decrypted image with 22 
iterations. Figure 2.5(f) shows the curve of iterative error during decryption. 
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(a)                              (b)                              (c) 
 
         
(d)                              (e)                                        (f) 
Fig. 2.5 (a) Original image; (b)–(d) three recorded diffraction intensity maps; 
(e) the decrypted image (22 iterations); (f) the curve of iterative error 
during decryption. 
 
In this method, the optical architecture is simplified since the 
interferometric scheme is avoided, and the requirement for stability will be 
exceedingly reduced. Moreover, the system is nonlinear since only the 
intensity of the complex encrypted image is recorded. The security of the 
system is thus improved. The original image can be retrieved from the 
recorded intensity maps with a phase retrieve algorithm. Subsequently, Qin et 
al. [58] proposed a simplified method based on diffractive imaging, which 
only requires single diffraction intensity map. Nevertheless, a digital 
appending redundant data on the original image is required before encryption 
[58]. A simplified encryption approach based on diffractive-imaging without 
redundant data is further developed using single diffraction map [59]. 
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The linearity of DRPE scheme is broken and the security is enhanced 
by recording the intensity of the encrypted complex field only. However, 
recently Li and Shi [60] showed that an encryption model based on diffractive 
imaging is vulnerable to a chosen plaintext attack based on a new type of 
multi-slice ptychographic phase retrieval algorithm. 
 
2.4   Asymmetric cryptosystem 
2.4.1  Asymmetric cryptosystem based on PTFT 
To overcome the limitations of a linear symmetric cryptosystem, an 
asymmetric cryptosystem based on PTFT using nonlinear phase truncation 
was proposed in 2010 [18]. This produces a real-value ciphertext with two 
public keys and a user is able to recover the original image with two private 
keys. Due to the nonlinearity of phase truncation, the encryption system is able 
to achieve a high degree of robustness against attacks that DRPE systems are 
vulnerable to. 
Figure 2.6(a) shows the encryption process of the PTFT-based 
asymmetric cryptosystem [18]. Similar to DRPE technique, two random phase 
masks 1( , )R x y  and 2 ( , )R u v  are located at the apatial and Fourier planes, 
respectively. The original image ( , )f x y  can be encrypted to ciphertext  
( , )C x y  using the following equations: 
 

























Fig. 2.6  Flowchart of  (a) the encryption process and (b) decryption process. 
 
 
1( , ) PT{FT[ ( , ) ( , )]},g u v f x y R x y                                                               (2.8) 
2( , ) PT{IFT[ ( , ) ( , )]}.C x y g u v R u v                                                              (2.9) 
 
where PT{} denotes a phase truncation operator, FT[] and IFT[] denote a 
Fourier transform (FT) and an inverse Fourier transform (IFT), respectively. In 
PTFT-based cryptosystem, the two encryption keys are regarded as public 
keys and are not needed during the decryption process. The decryption keys 
employed are given by 
 
2 1( , ) PR{FT[ ( , ) ( , )]},P u v f x y R x y                                                            (2.10) 
1 2( , ) PR{IFT[ ( , ) ( , )]}.P x y g u v R u v                                                           (2.11) 




where PR{} denotes a phase reservation operator. It is seen that the decryption 
keys 
1( , )P x y  and 2 ( , )P u v  are different from the encryption keys 1( , )R x y  and 
2 ( , )R u v . Figure 2.6(b) shows the decryption process, the original image 
( , )f x y  can be retrieved using the following equations: 
 
1( , ) PT{FT[ ( , ) ( , )]},g u v C x y P x y                                                             (2.12) 
2( , ) PT{IFT[ ( , ) ( , )]}.f x y g u v P u v                                                            (2.13) 
 
It is seen from Eqs. (2.10) and (2.11) that the decryption keys are 
related to the original image, which means that every image has unique 
decryption keys. Hence, it is immune to various known-plaintext (ciphertext) 
attacks to which the DRPE is vulnerable. 
However, this method is found to be vulnerable to a specific [19] and a 
new method [20] of attacks based on iterative phase retrieval algorithms. 
Subsequently, techniques, such as amplitude modulation [61] and spherical 
wave illumination [62], were proposed to avoid the iterative amplitude-phase 
retrieval attacks. Recently, Liu et al. [63] proposed an asymmetric 
cryptosystem security enhancement using the Yang–Gu amplitude-phase 
retrieval algorithm, in which the public and private key structures are 
redesigned in a more complicated pattern. 
Recently, a silhouette problem has been found existing in the PTFT-
based cryptosystem [64, 65]. In the PTFT-based cryptosystem, the information 
on the original image can be retrieved from only one decryption key. In this 
case, the ciphertext and other decryption key may be useless and the security 
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performance of system is reduced [64, 65]. Hence, techniques that can 
eliminate the silhouette problem are needed. At the same time, a new 
asymmetric cryptosystem, which is more secure and robust, is urgently 
required. 
 
2.4.2  Asymmetric cryptosystem based on EMD 
Recently, a new asymmetric cryptosystem based on EMD, which is free from 
the silhouette problem and is robust against specific attack, has been proposed 
[66]. The procedure for optical encryption based on coherent superposition 
and EMD is shown as follows. Let ( , )I x y  denote the intensity distribution of 
an original image. A function ( , )I u v  can be constructed as: 
 
( , ) FT{ ( , ) ( , )]},I u v I x y R x y                                                                  (2.14) 
 
where ( , )R x y  denotes a random phase mask. A complex value can be 
regarded as a vector in a two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system, where 
the horizontal and vertical components denote the real part (Re) and imaginary 
part (Im) respectively.  
It is shown in Fig. 2.7 that ( , )I u v  is divided into two masks 1( , )P u v  
and 2 ( , )P u v  with equal modulus. A function ( , )u v  can be written as 
 
1( , ) 2 rand( , ) arg{ ( , )},u v u v P u v                                                           (2.15) 
 
where rand( , )u v  is a random function distributed in [0, 1] and arg{} denotes 
the argument of a function. The amplitude and phase of ( , )I u v  are given by 
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( , ) | ( , ) |A u v I u v  and ( , ) arg{ ( , )}u v I u v  , respectively. From simple 
geometrical deduction, masks 1( , )P u v  and 2 ( , )P u v  are given by: 
 
1
( , ) / 2
( , ) exp{ ( , )},
cos[ ( , ) ( , )]
A u v
P u v i u v





                                           (2.16) 
2
( , ) / 2
( , ) exp{ [2 ( , ) ( , )]}.
cos[ ( , ) ( , )]
A u v
P u v i u v u v





                        (2.17) 
 
The encryption process described above is further illustrated in a flowchart 









Fig. 2.7  Schematic representation of equal modulus decomposition. 
 
 





















Fig. 2.8  (a) flowchart of the encryption process; (b) schematic setup for the 
decryption process. 
 
In the cryptosystem, two encryption keys ( , )R x y  and ( , )u v  are 
employed as public keys. 1( , )P u v  is considered as a ciphertext and 2 ( , )P u v  a 
private key. With masks 1( , )P u v  and 2 ( , )P u v , the original image is retrieved 
from the following equation: 
 
1 2
1 2( , ) | FT { ( , ) ( , )}|I x y P u v P u v
                                                              (2.18) 
 
The decryption process is shown in Fig. 2.8(b). It is noteworthy that since the 
modulus of ciphertext 1( , )P u v  is equal to that of the private key 2 ( , )P u v , the 
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ciphertext will disclose some information on the private key. This will lead to 
a security flaw in the EMD-based asymmetric cryptosystem. 
 
2.5   Optical image encryption based on interference 
Optical image encryption based on interference has attracted much attention. 
This method encrypts an original image into two phase-only masks based on 
interference principle. The iterative algorithm is not required during 
encryption and the phase-only masks are generated analytically. Optical 
experiments have been conducted to validate the feasibility of this method 
using double-step holographic exposure [67] and the holographic projection 









Fig. 2.9  Schematic setup for decryption process. 
 
A digital approach is applied to encrypt an original image into two 
phase-only masks 1M  and 2M . The decryption process can be conducted 
either optically or digitally (virtual optics) as shown in Fig. 2.9. Two beams 
from the phase-only masks 1M  and 2M  are combined through the beam 
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splitter cube. Then a decrypted image will be shown at the image plane. For an 
arbitrary non-negative original image ( , )f x y , it is phase perturbed and 
separated into phase-only masks 1M  and 2M  by 
 




2 2exp( 2 / )( , , )= exp ( ) ,
i d i







                                            (2.20) 
 
is the point pulse function,  R(x, y) is a random function uniformly distributed 
in [0, 2π],   is the wavelength of light, and d is axial distance between the 
phase-only mask ( 1M  or 2M ) plane and the image plane.  
Using the convolution theorem, one can obtain 
 
FT{ ( , ) exp[ ( , )]}
[exp( M1)+exp( M2)] IFT ,
FT[ ( , , )]
f x y iR x y
i i




                   (2.21) 
 
The phase-only masks 1M  and 2M  can be obtained as: 
 
1 arg( ) arccos[abs( ) / 2],M D D                                                                (2.22) 
2 1arg[ exp( )],M D iM                                                                              (2.23) 
 
where IFT{FT{ ( , ) exp[ ( , )]}/ FT[ ( , , )]}D f x y iR x y h x y d , arg{} denotes the 
argument of a function and abs{} denotes the modulus of a function.  
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However, a silhouette of the original image can be reconstructed using 
any one of the generated phase-only masks, which could be considered as 
system deficiency (silhouette problem) [23]. Figure 2.10(a) shows the original 
image. Figures 2.10(b) and (c) show the phase-only masks 1M  and 2M  given 
by Eqs. (2.22) and (2.23), respectively. The decrypted images using only one 
phase-only mask ( 1M  or 2M ) are shown in Figs. 2.10(d) and (e), respectively. 
It can be seen that the information on the original image can be extracted using 
only one of the phase-only masks. 
Many silhouette removal or security enhancement methods have been 
proposed [23, 69–77]. Zhang et al. [23] resolved the silhouette problem 
through exchanging the same parts of two phase-only masks. Han et al. [69] 
showed that the input image can be encrypted into one phase-only mask and 
one amplitude-only mask. Niu et al. [70] proposed an approach to encrypt two 
images into three diffractive phase elements (PDEs) using two incident light 
with different wavelengths. Kumar et al. [71] resolved the silhouette problem 
using jigsaw transform. Yang et al. [72] employed an improved GS algorithm 
to encrypt an image digitally into one POM and another predefined phase-only 
mask. Subsequently, Wang and Zhao [73] further resolved the silhouette 
problem by encrypt an image into three phase-only masks and Wang [75] 
proposed a phase blend processing method, in which the image is encrypted 
into three phase-only masks, to remove the silhouette problem. Recently, Chen 
et al. [77] used an iterative phase retrieval algorithm to resolve the silhouette 
problem. 
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(a)                            (b)                            (c) 
  
(d)                            (e) 
Fig. 2.10  (a) original image; (c) phase distribution of mask 1M ; (d) phase 
distribution of mask 2M ; (d) a decrypted image using only 1M ; (b) 
a decrypted image using only 2M . 
 
2.6   Multiple-image encryption 
In recent years, work on storage and transmission efficiency in 
multiple-image encryption has also been carried out. Since Situ and Zhang’s 
work for multiple-image encryption which used wavelength and position 
multiplexing method [78, 79], various other approaches, such as multi-
channeled encryption [80], interference-based position multiplexing [81] and 
lateral shifting [82, 83] have followed. However, these techniques could 
encounter cross-talk noise problem as the encrypted images are recorded on a 
single medium by direct superposition. As a consequence, the total number of 
images is limited and thus restricting the application range of the techniques. 
To overcome the cross-talk problem, iterative phase retrieval algorithms [84–
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95] have been explored. In this regards, Hwang et al [84–86] employed a 
modified Gerchberg–Saxton algorithm to reduce cross-talk noises. In the 
methods, cross-talk noise is reduced significantly, but at the cost of a reduction 
in the size of encrypted image due to the size limitation of output plane. The 
encryption method in the Fresnel domain proposed by Shi et al. [87] has 
reduced the cross-talk noise, but the encrypted capacity is also limited due to 
the lost of information during the diffraction process. Xiao et al. [88] proposed 
an improved system using a 4-f optical architecture and a cascaded phase 
retrieval algorithm. The encrypted capacity is thus significantly enhanced 
without any cross-talk noises. Recently, a multiple-image nonlinear 
cryptosystem by using a combination of phase retrieval algorithm and phase 
mask multiplexing is proposed [95]. In this method, cross-talk noises are 
removed resulting in a large improvement of the encryption capacity while the 
security is also enhanced by a nonlinear approach. Although these iterative 
phase retrieval algorithms based techniques perform well in eliminating cross-
talk noises, the iterative algorithms employed are time-consuming. 
Meanwhile, some other techniques were also investigated for multiple-
image encryption, such as information prechoosing [96], compressive 
holography [97] and spectral multiplexing operation [98]. Recently, a 
multiple-color image encryption based on optical coherent superposition and 
spiral phase encoding was proposed [99]. The nonlinear approach in this 
method achieves a high security and cross-talk noises are eliminated. 
 
2.7   Optical encryption based on ghost imaging 
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Ghost imaging has drawn wide attention recently owing to its remarkable 
characteristics [24–28]. In ghost imaging, the object image can be retrieved 
using two spatially correlated beams. One of the beams illuminates the object 
to be imaged, and the photons transmitted by the object are detected by a 
bucket detector (a single-pixel sensor without spatial resolution). The other 
beam (so-called reference beam) impinges on a charge-coupled device (CCD), 
without ever passing through the object. Nevertheless, by performing the 
correlation of the intensity recorded by the CCD with the intensity recorded by 
the bucket detector, an image of the object is reconstructed. In practice, the 
CCD can be removed in computational ghost imaging as the field that 
produces the illumination patterns can be computer-programmed [100, 101]. 
The applications based on ghost imaging have been extensively explored, such 
as remote sensing [29] and optical encryption [30, 102–108]. 
Ghost imaging provides an interesting research perspective for optical 
security and effectively enriches conventional optical security field. A series 
of random phase masks are usually employed as security keys and intensity 
values recorded by the bucket detector are employed as ciphertext. Different 
from the existing optical encryption schemes, ghost-imaging-based security 
system encodes object image into an intensity vector, rather than a complex-
valued matrix, which is more convenience in optical implementation, data 
transmission and storage.  
 




Fig. 2.11  A schematic setup for ghost imaging. SLM, spatial light modulator; 
BSC, beam splitter cube. 
 
Figure 2.11 shows a schematic for ghost imaging. A series of 
independent random phase masks are introduced on the spatial light modulator 
(SLM). A bucket detector (without spatial resolution) measures the light 
transmitted through the object. For each phase mask ( )i x (i=1, 2, 3, …, M) 
embedded in the SLM, the intensity value recorded by the bucket detector is 
given by 
 
2( ) | ( ) | ,i iB I x f x dx                                                                                 (2.24) 
 
where ( )f x  denotes the amplitude transmittance of the object. ( )iI x  is the 
intensity of the Fresnel diffraction field of ( , )i x y , 
 
2
( ) exp[ ( )] ( , ) ,i iI x j x h x d                                                                    (2.25) 
 
where h(x,d) is the point pulse function of the Fresnel transform, d is the axial 
distance between the SLM and the bucket detector plane. It is noteworthy that 
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the intensity ( )iI x  can be computed by authorized users using Eq. (2.25), 
provided that the set of phase masks is known [100, 101]. 
In conventional ghost imaging [30, 102–108], the object is 
reconstructed by correlating the bucket detector measurements { }iB  with the 








O x B B I x
M 
                                                                         (2.26) 
 
where   iM
1
 denotes an ensemble average over M measurements.  
The image shown in Fig. 2.12(a) is encrypted using the computational 
ghost-imaging-based cryptosystem. When a series of random phase masks are 
sequentially embedded into the SLM, the intensity points { }iB  are 
correspondingly obtained by the bucket detector as shown in Fig. 2.12(b). The 
number of measurements is 5000, i.e., M = 5000. The reconstructed image 
using the correct security keys are shown in Fig. 2.12(c). When a series of 
wrong security keys are employed, the reconstructed image is shown in Fig. 
2.12(d). The reconstructed object does not show any information on the 
original image. 
However, it can be seen in Eq. (2.24) that the relation between the 
original image ( )iI x  and ciphertext iB  is linear. The ghost-imaging-based 
security system has been recently found vulnerable to a chosen-plaintext 
attack [31]. Hence, it is expected that a nonlinear system can be developed to 
improve the security of the ghost-imaging-based security system. 












(a)                              (b) 
      
(c)                              (d) 
Fig. 2.12  (a) Original image; (b) a series of 1D intensity points as ciphertexts; 
(c) reconstructed image using correct security keys; (d) 
reconstructed image using wrong security keys. The number of 









IMPROVEMENT ON DRPE 
 
 
3.1   Compressive sensing-based DRPE 
The conventional DRPE is proven to be vulnerable to various attacks [12–17]. 
Further, numerous methods have been suggested to overcome the vulnerability 
of the DRPE based methods [32, 109–112]. Recently, compressive sensing 
theory draws much attention in the signal and image processing area [113–
115]. The theory is initially proposed by Donoho, Candès, Romberg and Tao 
et al. [116–118]. The compressive sensing technique helps to recover a 
complete signal from a sample of size less than the Nyquist rate [119, 120].  
In this research work, a new image encryption and decryption technique 
which utilizes compressive sensing concept along with DRPE is proposed. 
Space multiplexing method can be employed for integrating multiple images. 
The method which results in a nonlinear encryption system is able to overcome 
the vulnerability of conventional DRPE. Compressive sensing technique and 
space multiplexing are able to provide additional key space in the proposed 
method. The proposed system is also employed against chosen plaintext attacks 
and it is found that the inclusion of compressive sensing enhances the 
robustness against the attacks.  
 





The compressive sensing method claims that certain signals could be 
recovered completely from a very small number of sample size or 
measurements. To achieve this, compressive sensing theory depends on two 
principles sparsity and incoherence [120]. For most signals, significant 
features in the signal are much lesser than its resolution. Those signals could 
be represented sparsely in certain basis ψ  and compressive sensing theory 
exploits this property of the signals. A non adaptive sensing protocol Ω , 
which is incoherent with the sparsifying basis ψ , is used to capture the 
information. The lower the coherence between the sensing operator and 
sparsifying operator, the smaller the number of samples required for accurate 
reconstruction. Since compressive sensing is used for data acquisition, the 
signal would be unknown before sensing. Hence generally, a non-adaptive 
sensing protocol Ω , which is not dependent on the signal, would be used. 
The data acquisition model of the compressive sensing framework is 
shown in Eq. (3.1) where X  is the image having N pixels, F  is the Fourier 
transform, Ω  is a sensing protocol, B  is a sampled data having M pixels and 
M N<< . 
 
B F X= Ω⋅ ⋅                                                                                                   (3.1) 
 
Since the data are sparse in the frequency domain, the Fourier 
transform is used as a sparsifying operator. Equation (3.1) is ill-conditioned 
and results in many solutions for X . However, the compressive sensing theory 
suggests that image X  can be reconstructed iteratively from the sampled data 





and ˆFB X−Ω⋅ ⋅  ℓ2 are respectively, ℓ1 and ℓ2 norms and δ is an allowable 
error to compensate for the noise in the signal [120]. 
The sensing protocol Ω  is as important as the sampled data B  for the 
reconstruction. The non-adaptive sensing operator is suitable for data 
acquisition but in applications where signal information is already available, 
the sensing operator could be adaptive. Moreover, a fixed sensing operator 
would be less robust and more prone to attacks for image encryption. Hence, 
instead of having a fixed or random sensing operator Ω , a method is proposed 
to generate a unique Ω  operator for each image to enhance the robustness of 
the system. If M pixels need to be selected from an image data ( ),f x y which 
has N  pixels, all the pixels in the image are ranked based on their values in 
the frequency domain and M  number of pixels with the largest values are 
selected. A unique sampling operator ( ),u vΩ  which is an array representing 
the indexes of the selected pixels in frequency/Fourier domain is obtained. 
This operator is adaptive and unique as the frequency distribution of every 
image is unique. The uniqueness of the operator prevents the encryption 
system from having a constant key set in each encrypted image. Hence it 
provides an additional key space in the encryption system. 
The ratio of a sample size to the original image size gives the sampling 
ratio R (( / ) 100)M N × . The larger a sampling ratio is, the better is the 
correlation value. However, a smaller value of R  provides more possible 
combinations if brutal force attack is employed on the sensing operator. 
Consequently it increases the robustness of the encryption system and 





based on the intended application should be chosen. It is also possible to have 
different values of R  for different images in a given set of data. 
 
3.1.2   Space Multiplexing 
Due to the sampling ratio used, the image size for encryption is small. A space 
multiplexing method can be suggested to utilize the remaining space for 
multiple image encryptions. If ( ),is x y  are sampled images each of size M  
pixels and ( ),ib x y are binary mask of size N  pixels in each mask, then 
( ),m x y is the synthesized ciphertext of size N pixels. Each image data 
( ),is x y is assigned with a binary mask ( ),ib x y  which has values either ‘1’ or 
‘0’. The value ‘1’ represents the spaces occupied by the corresponding image 
data ( ),is x y  in the synthesized ciphertext ( ),m x y . Hence each ( ),ib x y  mask 
should have M pixels of value ‘1’ and they should be mutually exclusive from 
each other. Once the binary masks ( ),ib x y  are generated as mentioned above, 
it will be sequentially applied on corresponding sampled data ( ),is x y  and a 
summation of all the images will provide a synthesized ciphertext ( ),m x y . 
For space multiplexing, if there are k  images that need to be encrypted 
using a fixed value of sampling rate R , then k  and R  should meet the 
condition of 100k R× ≤ . If the total space available for all the images is N  
pixels and if each image occupies M  pixels, the total pixels occupied by 
k number of images should be less than N  i.e. k M N× ≤ . From this, the 






3.1.3   Image encryption and reconstruction 
Multiple images that need to be encrypted are sampled separately and 
combined to form a single ciphertext before DRPE encryption. Sampling of 
images is implemented digitally. However, the encryption and decryption 
processes of DRPE can be conducted either optically or digitally. The matrix 
representation of image sampling in frequency domain is shown in Eq. (3.2), 
where ( , )x y  represents a 2D matrix in the spatial domain and ( , )u v  
represents a 2D matrix in the frequency/Fourier domain. The value of i varies 
from 1 to k. Images ( ),if x y  are transformed to Fourier domain since the 
sparsifying operator is the Fourier transform and they are sampled by a 
sampling/sensing operator ( ),i u vΩ , as described in the previous section. An 
inverse Fourier transform is performed on sampled images ( ),iS u v  to obtain 
( ),is x y : 
 
[ ]( , ) ( , ) ( , )i i iS u v u v F f x y= Ω ⋅                                                                        (3.2) 
[ ]-1( , ) ( , )i is x y F S u v=                                                                                    (3.3) 
 
Sampling process is carried out digitally to obtain the Ω value for each image. 
The complex data ( ),is x y  of all sampled images are then combined by space 
multiplexing to form a single image ( ),m x y . This method of synthesizing the 
ciphertext from sampled images is carried out digitally during encryption; 
while for decryption, it can be conducted either optically or digitally. The 
synthesized image ( ),m x y , which includes all the data of the images, is 





phase mask  ( )M1 , yx  is placed next to image ( ),m x y . The encrypted 
complex data ( ),u x y  is recorded using a CCD/holographic plate. The 
recorded encrypted signal ( ),u x y  is: 
 
( ) [ ] [ ], ( , ) M1(x, y) M2( , )u x y m x y F u v= × ⊗                                                     (3.4) 
 
where ⊗  denotes a convolution operation. 
 
 







Fig. 3.2  Proposed decryption setup 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the decryption process. The encrypted image 
containing the complex signal ( ),u x y  is placed at the front focal plane of L3 
and the second key ( )cM2 ,u v , which is the complex conjugate of  ( )M2 ,u v  
is placed at the rear focal plane of L3. For the synthesized ciphertext to be 
recorded, the first key ( )cM1 ,x y , which is the complex conjugate of 
( )M1 , yx , is placed before the CCD. If each sampled data is to be recorded, 
the corresponding binary mask ( ),ib x y  would be placed at the rear focal plane 
of L4, in between the first key ( )cM1 ,x y  and the CCD. The synthesized 







-1'( , ) ( , ) M1 ( , ) M2 ( , )c cm x y u x y x y F u v   = × ⊗                                               (3.5) 
( )'( , ) nonzeros ( , ) '( , )i is x y b x y m x y= ×                                                            (3.6) 
 
While the corresponding binary keys ( ),ib x y  are applied on the decrypted 
synthesized ciphertext ( )' ,m x y , images of size N pixels are obtained. The 
corresponding sampled data ( )' ,is x y  of size M pixels would be spread out in 
the images. Hence a ‘nonzero’ function is required to retrieve the data 
( )' ,is x y . The retrieval will be carried out digitally. Since ( )' ,m x y and 
( )' ,is x y  are both complex data, holographic recording is used in the 
decryption process in both cases. In conventional DRPE, an amplitude image 
is encrypted and a second phase mask alone would be enough for the 
decryption. However, unlike the conventional DRPE method, the proposed 
technique requires the spatial phase mask ( )M1 ,x y  in the decryption process 
since ( )' ,m x y  contains complex data and not a real and positive image. 
Following the decryption process, compressive sensing reconstruction of the 
recorded data ( )' ,is x y  using the sensing operator ( ),i u vΩ  is carried out to 
obtain the original images ( ),if x y  by minimizing ( )ˆ , 1if x y   subject 
to ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ, , ,   2i i iS u v u v FT f x y δ −Ω ≤   . The reconstruction of images 
( ),if x y  is carried out iteratively using NESTA algorithm [121]. 
 





The linearity of an encryption system makes it vulnerable to known-
plain and chosen plaintext attacks. The Dirac Delta function which has same 
value for all the pixels in the Fourier domain will provide phase masks key 
easily. Though Dirac Delta function could be easily prohibited from 
encryption by a simple check, a linear combination of two images which 
provides Dirac Delta function could possess a major threat. The addition of 
compressive sensing would introduce non-linearity to the system since the 
sensing operator ( ),i u vΩ  used in this method chooses M largest value pixels 
in the frequency domain. This operation could not be conducted linearly, 
except when all the pixel values in the frequency domain are the same and it 
does not matter which pixels are chosen. As mentioned earlier, Dirac Delta 
function would provide a spread out of the pixel values in the frequency 
domain and any linear combination of images which provide Dirac Delta 
function would be nonlinearly transformed rendering the proposed method 
immune to this chosen-plaintext attack. A numerical experiment to validate 
the nonlinearity of the system and demonstrate its robustness against a chosen-
plaintext attack is shown in section 3.1.5.  
 
3.1.5   Results and discussion 
A numerical experiment is carried out to examine the effectiveness and 
feasibility of the system. Four images of size 256 256×  pixels as shown in 
Figs. 3.3(a)–(d) are the plaintext images chosen to be encrypted. The 
corresponding sampled image data of size 128 128×  pixels are shown in Figs. 



















(i)                         (j) 
Fig. 3.3  Simulated results using the proposed method. (a–d) Images before 
encryption (256×256); (e–h) sampled image data after compressive 
sampling (128×128); (i) single synthesized image after space 
multiplexing (256×256); (j) encrypted image after DRPE (256×256). 
 
synthesized from the sampled data. Further DRPE encryption on the ciphertext 
provides the encrypted image [See Fig. 3.3(j)]. The decryption process which 
includes optical decryption process followed by compressive sensing 
reconstruction provides the decrypted images of size 256 256×  pixels as 
shown in Figs. 3.4(a)–(d). NESTA is not able to provide the exact 





correlation coefficient (CC) values between plaintexts and decrypted images 
are greater than 0.99. This shows the proposed system is effective and able to 







(a)                           (b)                           (c)                           (d) 
Fig. 3.4  Decrypted images (256×256) with (a) CC = 0.9933 (b) CC = 0.9968 
(c) CC = 0.9994 and (d) CC = 0.9951. 
 
The proposed method requires both DRPE keys during decryption. If 
the DRPE keys are not available and randomly generated keys are used, the 
decrypted images would not be able to provide the plaintexts. Figures 3.5(a)–
(d) show decrypted images using a wrong key for the first phase mask and 
Figs. 3.5(e)–(h) show decrypted images using a wrong key for the second 
phase mask. The results show the necessity of using both correct DRPE keys 
for decrypting the ciphertexts. 
In the proposed method, binary masks which are used to integrate the 
sampled data are required during the decryption process. If wrong binary keys 
are used, the sampled data of different images will be mixed together resulting 
in erroneous compressive reconstruction. Figures 3.6(a)–(d) show images 
obtained when wrong binary keys are used for decryption. The results show 
that binary keys are also crucial during decryption. Since binary masks are 





incorrect binary keys are used to analyze the robustness of the binary masks. 
Figure 3.6(e) shows a plot of correlation achieved against the partially 
incorrect binary keys. The results show that only a 100% correct binary mask 











 (e)                          (f)                          (g)                         (h) 
Fig. 3.5  Robustness check of proposed system to the deployment of wrong 
DRPE keys. (a)–(d) Decrypted images with wrong first phase mask 
key (a) CC = 0.0198 (b) CC = 0.0286 (c) CC = 0.0123 and (d) CC = 
0.0132; (e)–(h) decrypted images with wrong second phase mask 






















Fig. 3.6  Decrypted images with wrong binary keys (a) CC = 0.0397, (b) CC = 
0.044 (c) CC = 0.0059 and (d) CC = 0.0243; (e) plot showing 
correlation value against resemblance percentage of the partially 
incorrect binary keys used with correct binary masks. 
 
The sampling ratio R  determines the maximum number of images that 
can be encrypted. In previous sections, four images are encrypted with a 
sampling ratio of 25%. The same images are encrypted with lower sampling 
ratios of 0% to 25% and they are shown in Figs. 3.7(a1)–(c4). Figure 3.8 
shows a plot of average correlation against the sampling ratio R . The results 
show that a decrease in the sampling ratio decreases the details that can be 





that images with a sampling ratio R  larger than 16.66% will have a 
correlation value higher than 99% and it also provides sufficient space to 
encrypt 6 images. However even with a sampling ratio as low as 4% a 
reasonable correlation of 95% can be obtained. At such a low sampling ratio, a 
maximum of 25 images can be encrypted. 
 
    
(a1)                        (a2)                        (a3)                        (a4) 
    
(b1)                        (b2)                        (b3)                        (b4) 
    
(c1)                        (c2)                        (c3)                        (c4) 
Fig. 3.7  Effect of sampling ratio on decrypted images. (a1)–(a4) Decrypted 
images for sampling ratio 16.66% (a1) CC = 0.9891 (a2) CC = 
0.9947 (a3) CC = 0.9984 and (a4) CC = 0.9926; (b1)–(b4) decrypted 
images for sampling ratio 10% (b1) CC = 0.9826 (b2) CC = 0.9912 
(b3) CC = 0.9919 and (b4) CC = 0.9884; (c1)–(c4) decrypted images 
for sampling ratio 4% (c1) CC = 0.9668 (c2) CC = 0.9796 (c3) CC = 






Fig. 3.8  Plot showing correlation against sampling ratio R. 
 
The proposed method contains four secret keys ( )M1 ,x y , ( )M2 ,u v , 
( ),ib x y  and ( ),i u vΩ . Attacks on DRPE system generally exploit the linearity 
property of the system. In the proposed method, the inclusion of compressive 
sensing technique renders the encryption system nonlinear. The sensing 
operator ( ),i u vΩ ensures that an image is nonlinearly transformed after 
compressive sampling is carried out. A centered Dirac Delta function, which 
has one value in the frequency domain, cannot be transformed nonlinearly. 
This could potentially present a threat in a chosen plaintext attack. However, a 
check for suspicious plaintext attacks could be employed during the sampling 
process and hence this function no longer poses a security problem. 
To ensure that the encryption system is nonlinear, a chosen plaintext 
attack is deployed on the system. The plaintexts (P1 and P2) are designed in 
such a way that the difference between the plaintexts provides a centered 






P1( , ) P2( , )x y x y− = ∆                                                                                     (3.7) 
 
 If the encryption system is linear and the relation between the ciphertexts and 
the plaintexts is described with an encryption function λ , the corresponding 
ciphertexts C1 and C2 are given by: 
 
C1( , ) P1( , )x y x yλ= ⋅                                                                                      (3.8) 
C2( , ) P2( , )x y x yλ= ⋅                                                                                     (3.9) 
 
 The difference between ciphertexts C1 and C2 provides the second 
phase mask given by: 
 
C1( , ) C2( , ) (P1( , ) P1( , ))x y x y x y x yλ− = ⋅ −                                                  (3.10) 
C1( , ) C2( , )x y x y λ− = ⋅∆                                                                             (3.11) 
 
To reduce the complexity, the proposed chosen text attack is carried 
out with a single image. Hence space multiplexing is not employed. Figs. 
3.9(a)–(d) show the plaintexts P1and P2 and the corresponding ciphertexts C1 
and C2. The plaintext attack employed is not able to provide the correct phase 
mask [Figs. 3.9(e) and (f)] and no useful information is obtained after 
decryption [Fig. 3.9(g)]. This shows that the proposed method is robust against 
a chosen plaintext attack. If the proposed system is linear, the encrypted image 
of Dirac Delta function would be similar to that image obtained by subtracting 
ciphertexts C2 from C1 (based on Eq. 3.11). Figure 3.9(h) shows the 





differs greatly with Fig. 3.9(e) and it has a poor correlation of 0.16%. This 
shows that, compressive sensing has rendered the system nonlinear and hence 











(e)                         (f)                         (g)                         (h) 
Fig. 3.9  Robustness of proposed system against plaintext attacks. (a) Plaintext 
P1; (b) plaintext P2; (c) ciphertext C1; (d) ciphertext C2; (e) 
difference between ciphertexts C1 and C2; (f) actual (Fourier) phase 
mask used for encryption; (g) decrypted image using incorrect 
plaintext attack key, CC = 0.0024; (h) encrypted Dirac Delta function 
using proposed method. 
 
In addition, since the sampling operator ( ),i u vΩ  is unique for each 
image, it is difficult to be obtained randomly. To determine the correct key 
( ),i u vΩ , one must have the original image data. In order to obtain the correct 
key for a given image, the intruder needs to search for all possible values of 
the sampling operator. For example, if a 100 100×  pixels image is sampled 





obtain the correct key is 102440 ~ 1.5×102440. Hence without knowledge of the 
original image, it would be highly unlikely to obtain the correct key by any 
artificial intelligence means. In a multiple image encryption, the addition of 
binary keys ( ),ib x y  and other unknown DRPE keys further increases the 
complexity for any attack. The compressive sensing and DRPE combination 
compliments each other well. The nonlinearity of compressive sensing helps 
DRPE to overcome its vulnerability against chosen plaintext and known 




3.2   DRPE with photon-counting using only the amplitude of 
the encrypted image 
In last section, a compressive sensing technique is introduced to overcome the 
vulnerability of the conventional DRPE. To increase the security of DRPE, a 
photon-counting (PC) technique has been integrated with the DRPE technique 
for encryption and security verification [35–40]. However, in both DRPE and 
PC-DRPE techniques, a complex value encrypted image is produced and a 
holographic or interferometric scheme is usually applied to record the phase. 
As a result, the encryption architecture is complicated and high stability is 
required. In this research work, a PC-DRPE technique without using the phase 
of the encrypted image is proposed. During optical encryption, an image is 
encrypted by the DRPE, and only the photon-limited amplitude of the 





correct phase masks together with the photon-limited amplitude of the 
encrypted image, the image can be decrypted and authenticated. Both 
amplitude-based [5] and full-phase encryptions [122, 123] are investigated. 
Both the encryption and decryption processes are simplified since complex 
amplitude recording of the encrypted image, such as in an interferometric 
setup, is not needed. In addition, PC provides sparse sensing and nonlinear 
transformation and may make the system more robust against attacks.  
 
3.2.1   Encryption and decryption process 
The DRPE technique encrypts an image into a stationary white noise. Both 
amplitude-based and full-phase encryptions are considered. For simplicity, 
one-dimensional notation is used. Let ( )f x  denote the input image. Let a(x) 
and b(µ) denote two statistically independent sequences uniformly distributed 
in [0, 1]. The encrypted image, ( )xψ , for the amplitude-based and full-phase 
DRPE are given by 
 
( ) { ( ) exp[ 2 ( )]} ( ),A x f x i a x h xψ p= ⊗                                                         (3.12) 
( ) {exp[ ( )]exp[ 2 ( )]} ( ),P x i f x i a x h xψ p p= ⊗                                             (3.13) 
 
where ⊗  denotes convolution, and the Fourier transform of h(x) is 
exp[ 2 ( )]i bp µ . The encrypted complex image ( )xψ  can be rewritten as 
( ) | ( ) | exp[ ( )]x x i xψψ ψ φ=  where | ( ) |xψ is the amplitude and ( )xψφ  is the 
phase.  
The photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted image, | ( ) |xx , can be 





imaging approach is applied to the amplitude of the encrypted image [Eqs. 
(3.12) and (3.13)]. The normalized irradiance is calculated such that 
1
( ) | ( ) | | ( ) |Mj j jjg x x xψ ψ== ∑ . The photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted 
image for the amplitude-based and full-phase DRPE, | ( ) |A xx  and | ( ) |P xx , are 
obtained by using Eq. (2.2). 
In conventional DRPE and PC-DRPE techniques, both the amplitude 
and phase of the encrypted image are needed to be recorded and used for 
decryption. While in the proposed method, only the amplitude of encrypted 
image is recorded while the phase is not retained. 
In the proposed decryption scheme, instead of using the phase of the 
encrypted image, ( )xψφ , a phase recov ( )xφ  is numerically generated from the 
two phase masks: 
 
recov recov recov( ) | ( ) | exp[ ( )] exp[ 2 ( )] ( ),x x i x i a x h xψ ψ φ p= = ⊗                        (3.15) 
 
where recov ( )xψ  is the complex-valued function generated from the two phase 
masks with amplitude recov| ( ) |xψ  and phase recov ( )xφ . The generated phase 
recov ( )xφ  is combined with the photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted 
image, | ( ) |xx , to form a new function new recov( ) | ( ) | exp[ ( )]x x i xψ x φ= . The 
decryption process of the DRPE technique is then used. For the amplitude-
based PC-DRPE, a Fourier transform of new ( )xψ  is taken and it is then 
multiplied by the phase mask exp[ 2 ( )]i bp µ− . The inverse Fourier transform 





recover the photon-limited decrypted image ph ( )Ad x . Therefore, the final 
decrypted image for the amplitude-based encryption, ph ( )Ad x , is defined by 
 
ph new( ) ( ) ( ) ,Ad x x m xψ= ⊗                                                                          (3.16) 
 
where m(x) is a function whose Fourier transform is exp[ 2 ( )]i bp µ− . 
For the full-phase encryption, the decrypted image can be obtained in a 
similar fashion. The photon-limited decrypted image, ph ( )Pd x , is [122, 123] 
 
ph new( ) Arg{[ ( ) ( )]exp[ 2 ( )]} ,Pd x x m x i a xψ p p= ⊗ −                                   (3.17) 
 
where Arg is the argument function. 
When a small number of photons, pN , is employed, the decrypted 
image cannot clearly render the visual information [35–40]. Optical 
verification based on nonlinear correlation algorithms [43, 44] is applied to 
authenticate the decoded image, ph ( )d x . The kth-law nonlinear correlation [43, 








( ) IFT |FT[ ( )]{FT[ ( )]} |
FT[ ( )]{FT[ ( )]} ,
kr x f x d x





                                                      (3.18) 
 
where k denotes the strength of the applied nonlinearity [43, 44], asterisk 
denotes complex conjugate. A flowchart is shown in Fig. 3.10 to illustrate the 






Fig. 3.10  Flowchart for the proposed optical encryption and verification 
system. 
 
3.2.2   Results and discussion 
3.2.2.1   Amplitude-based encryption 
A numerical experiment is carried out to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed method. Both binary and gray-scale images for amplitude-based 
encryption are considered. A binary image [Fig. 3.11(a)] and a gray-scale 
image [Fig. 3.12(a)] of size 256 × 256 pixels are used as the primary input 
images, ( )f x . Figure 3.11(b) and 3.12(b) depict the amplitude of the binary 
and gray-scale encrypted images, | ( ) |A xψ , using the amplitude-based DRPE. 






Fig. 3.11  (a) Binary input image; (b) amplitude of the encrypted image using 
the amplitude-based DRPE, | ( ) |A xψ ; (c) photon-limited amplitude 
of the encrypted image, | ( ) |A xx , with pN  = 3×10
4 or 0.4578 
photons/pixel; (d) decrypted image without the phase of encrypted 
image, with pN  = 3×10
4 or 0.4578 photons/pixel; (e) decrypted 




and gray-scale encrypted images, | ( ) |A xx , which are sparse distributions, with 
pN  = 3×10
4 photons (0.4578 photons/pixel) and pN  = 2×10
4 photons (0.3052 
photons/pixel) respectively. The maximum numbers of photons per pixel for 
Figs. 3.11(c) and 3.12(c) are 6 and 5, respectively. Figures 3.11(d) and 3.12(d) 
depict the decrypted binary and gray-scale images obtained from the sparse 
encrypted distributions of Figs. 3.11(c) and 3.12(c) using Eq. (3.16). The 
correlation coefficients (CC) [10, 33] for Figs. 3.11(d) and 3.12(d) are 0.0731 
and 0.0971, respectively. No useful information on the original images can be 





the entire scene is increased to pN  = 10
6 (15.2588 photons/pixel), the 
decrypted binary and gray-scale images are shown in Figs. 3.11(e) and 3.12(e) 
respectively. The CC values for Figs. 3.11(e) and 3.12(e) are 0.2188 and 
0.6046, respectively. It is seen that when a small number of photons, pN , is 
employed, no useful information can be directly observed from the decrypted 
images [Figs. 3.11(d) and 3.12(d)]; when a larger number of photons, pN , is 




Fig. 3.12  (a) Gray-scale input image; (b) amplitude of the encrypted image 
using the amplitude-based DRPE, | ( ) |A xψ ; (c) photon-limited 
amplitude of the encrypted image, | ( ) |A xx , with pN  = 2×10
4 or 
0.3052 photons/pixel; (d) decrypted image without the phase of 
encrypted image, with pN  = 2×10
4 or 0.3052 photons/pixel; (e) 
decrypted image without the phase of encrypted image, with pN  = 


















































































Fig. 3.13  Peak to correlation energy (PCE) versus number of photons ( pN ) 
for different nonlinearities (k) for (a) a binary input image and (b) a 







Fig. 3.14  (a) Photon-limited decrypted binary images with pN  = 3×10
4 or 
0.4578 photons/pixel; (b) nonlinear correlation results using k = 
0.3 and the image shown in Fig. 3.11(a) as the reference image. 
The phase unknown correlation is normalized relative to the phase 
known correlation. 
 
The nonlinear correlation filter shown in Eq. (3.18) is used to 
authenticate the decrypted image using a low number of photons. To show the 
best parameter k for the verification application, the peak to correlation energy 





PCE max[| ( ) | ] / | ( ) | .M jjr x r x== ∑                                                             (3.19) 
 
Figure 3.13(a) plots the PCE curves of the binary image versus the number of 





( )f x   are compared by correlation. As can be seen when pN  is larger than 
104, the PCE value rapidly increases with the number of photons. The largest 
PCE value is obtained when k = 0.3 for a number of photons that below 106. In 
addition, k = 0.3 gives the best PCE results for a number of photons that below 
105 for the gray-scale image as shown in Fig. 3.13(b). Thus, nonlinear 
parameter k = 0.3 is selected. 
 
 
Fig. 3.15  (a) Photon-limited decrypted gray-scale images with pN  = 2×10
4 or 
0.3052 photons/pixel; (b) nonlinear correlation results using k = 0.3 
and the image shown in Fig. 3.12(a) as the reference image. The 
phase unknown correlation is normalized relative to the phase 
known correlation. 
 
To show the performance of the proposed method, it is compared to 





decrypted binary images and corresponding nonlinear correlation results with 
pN  = 3×10
4 of PC-DRPE with unknown phase (the proposed method) and 
PC-DRPE with known phase [35] to show information authentication. It is 
shown that when the phase is unknown, the decrypted image cannot be 
visually recognized. When the phase is known, the information in the primary 
image is visible. For the nonlinear correlation results, there is a sharp peak for 
both cases. The correlation peak for phase known is higher than that of phase 
unknown. Note that the sharp peak indicates the success of the verification. 
Similar results can be obtained for the gray-scale image [Fig. 3.15].  
 
 
Fig. 3.16  (a) Photon-limited decrypted binary images with pN  = 10
3 or 
0.0152 photons/pixel; (b) nonlinear correlation results using k = 
0.3 and the image shown in Fig. 3.11(a) as the reference image. 








Fig. 3.17  (a) Photon-limited decrypted gray-scale images with pN  = 7×10
3 or 
0.1068 photons/pixel; (b) nonlinear correlation results using k = 0.3 
and the image shown in Fig. 3.12(a) as the reference image. The 
phase unknown correlation is normalized relative to the phase 
known correlation. 
 
When the number of photons in the entire scene is reduced to pN  = 
103 for the binary image and pN  = 7×10
3 for the gray-scale image, the 
decrypted binary and gray-scale images and corresponding nonlinear 
correlation results of unknown phase and known phase are shown in Figs. 3.16 
and 3.17, respectively. For both phase unknown and phase known decrypted 
images, the primary image cannot be visually identified. However, for the 
nonlinear correlation results, there is no remarkable correlation peak and only 
a noisy background is obtained for the case of PC-DRPE with unknown phase. 





The above results illustrate that when the phase is known, the image can be 
authenticated using fewer photons compared to when the phase is unknown. 
 
 
Fig. 3.18 Nonlinear correlation result between recov ( )xφ  and ( )xψφ . (a) 
recov ( )xφ  is generated from correct phase masks; (b) recov ( )xφ  is 
generated from wrong phase masks. 
 
To show why the image can be decrypted and authenticated 
successfully using the generated phase recov ( )xφ  [Eq. (3.15)], the phase 
recov ( )xφ  generated from the correct phase masks is compared to the phase of 
the encrypted image, ( )xψφ . The binary input image [Fig. 3.11(a)] is used as 
an example and similar results can be obtained for the gray-scale input image. 
Fig. 3.18(a) shows the nonlinear correlation result between recov ( )xφ  and ( )xψφ . 
A remarkable correlation peak is observed over a noisy background. Thus the 
phase recov ( )xφ  generated from correct phase masks has correlation with the 
phase of the encrypted image, ( )xψφ . While the phase recov ( )xφ  generated from 
wrong phase masks has no correlation with the phase of the encrypted image, 
( )xψφ  [Fig. 3.18(b)]. The results illuminate that the phase recov ( )xφ  generated 





authentication; while the phase recov ( )xφ  generated from wrong phase masks 
does not. 
In the proposed method, the random and uniform distribution a(x) and 
b(µ) are both required during decryption process. Figures 3.19(a) and (b) show 
the decrypted binary images, when only a(x) or b(µ) is incorrect during the 
decoding, respectively. The corresponding nonlinear correlation distributions 
[Figs. 3.19(c) and (d)] show noisy background without any correlation peak. 
Similar results can be obtained for the gray-scale image. Thus the decrypted 
images cannot be verified successfully without the knowledge of both keys. 
 
 
Fig. 3.19  Photon-limited decrypted binary images when (a) a(x) or (b) b(µ) is 
incorrect during the decoding; (c)–(d) nonlinear correlation results 







Fig. 3.20  (a) False class binary image; (b) photon-limited decrypted image 
using the proposed method with pN  = 3×10
4 or 0.4578 
photons/pixel; (c) nonlinear correlation results using k = 0.3 and 
the image shown in Fig. 3.11(a) as the reference image. 
 
In order to examine the discrimination capability of the system, a 
different binary image ( )s x  [Fig. 3.20(a)], is encrypted based on the proposed 
method with pN  = 3×10
4. A decrypted image, ph ( )s x , as shown in Fig. 3.20(b) 
is obtained using the correct keys. The decrypted image, ph ( )s x , is similar to 
ph ( )Ad x  [Fig. 3.11(d)], with a noisy appearance. To verify its authenticity, the 
decrypted image ph ( )s x  is then compared with the original image by nonlinear 
correlation. Figure 3.20(c) shows the corresponding nonlinear correlation 





peak. The results demonstrate that the proposed method owns high 
discrimination capability in image authentication. 
 
 
Fig. 3.21  (a) Photon-limited decrypted images when the photon-limited 
amplitude of the encrypted images with pN  = 3×10
4 or 0.4578 
photons/pixel is contaminated by Gaussian noise (a) with a 
standard deviation of 0.1; (b) with a standard deviation of 0.2; 
(c)–(d) nonlinear correlation results respectively corresponding to 
the decrypted images in (a)–(b). 
 
Since a ciphertext may be contaminated by noise or occlusion in 
practical application, the robustness of the system against noise- and 
occlusion-contaminations is also investigated. White Gaussian noises with 
zero mean and varying standard deviations are added to the ciphertext to study 
the robustness of the system against additive noise. Figures 3.21(a) and (b) 






Fig. 3.22  (a) Photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted images with pN  = 
3×104 or 0.4578 photons/pixel contaminated by (a) a 10% 
occlusion; (b) a 25% occlusion; (c)–(d) photon-limited decrypted 
images from the photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted images 
shown in (a)–(b); (e)–(f) nonlinear correlation results respectively 
corresponding to the decrypted images in (c)–(d). 
 
image with pN  = 3×10
4, when the standard deviations of Gaussian noise are 
0.1 and 0.2, respectively. The corresponding nonlinear correlation 
distributions [Figs. 3.21(c) and (d)] show remarkable correlation peak points 





image. The results demonstrate the robustness of the proposed method against 
noise.  
The proposed system is also examined with occlusion contamination. 
Figures 3.22(a) and (b) show the photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted 
image with pN  = 3×10
4 contaminated by 10% and 20% occlusions, 
respectively. Figures 3.22(c) and (d) show the decrypted binary images of the 
photon-limited amplitude of the encrypted image shown in Figs. 3.22(a) and 
(b), respectively. The corresponding nonlinear correlation distributions [Figs. 
3.22(e) and (f)] show remarkable correlation peak points over a noisy 
background. Similar results can be obtained for the gray-scale image. The 
results demonstrate the robustness of the proposed method against occlusion 
contamination. 
 
3.2.2.2   Full-phase encryption 
The full-phase decrypted image [Eq. (3.17)] is compared to the amplitude-
based decrypted image [Eq. (3.16)] to see the performance of the full-phase 
and amplitude-based encryption using the proposed method. For the full-phase 
encryption, the binary image shown in Fig. 3.11(a) is used as the original 
image. 
Figures 3.23(a) and (b) show the decrypted binary images for the 
amplitude-based [Eq. (3.16)] and full-phase [Eq. (3.17)] encryption using the 
proposed method with pN  = 5×10
3 (0.0763 photons/pixel). The decrypted 
images cannot be visually recognized. Figures 3.23(c) and (d) show the 





respectively. The results demonstrate that there is not any correlation peak for 
the amplitude-based encryption; however, there is a remarkable correlation 
peak for the full-phase encryption. Thus the full-phase encryption requires 
fewer photons for authentication than the amplitude-based encryption for a 
binary image. Figure 3.24 shows the PCE curves versus number of photons, 
pN , for k = 0.3 when the decrypted images of the amplitude-based [Eq. (3.16)] 
and full-phase [Eq. (3.17)] encryption are compared to ( )f x  by nonlinear 
correlation. The results show that the full-phase encryption has a much higher 
PCE value than the amplitude-based encryption.  
 
 
Fig. 3.23  Photon-limited decrypted binary images with pN  = 5×10
3 or 0.0763 
photons/pixel for the (a) amplitude-based encryption, and (b) the 
full-phase encryption; (c)–(d) nonlinear correlation results 
respectively corresponding to the decrypted images in (a)–(b). The 










































Fig. 3.24  Peak to correlation energy (PCE) versus number of photons ( pN ) 
for k = 0.3 for a binary image. The results cannot be applied to a 
gray-scale image. 
 
3.3   Summary 
In this chapter, a new technique for multiple image encryption based on DRPE 
with compressive sensing is proposed. The images are first compressed to a 
much smaller signal in a sparse domain and the sampled signals of all the 
images are integrated into one single encrypted signal. The integrated 
ciphertext is further encrypted using DRPE technique. The integration of the 
signals is carried out using binary masks, which provides an extra key space 
for the proposed encryption system. The binary masks are used in decryption 
system to separate each image data after DRPE decryption, which is followed 
by compressive sensing reconstruction to obtain the complete image 
information. The method which results in a nonlinear encryption system is 





sensing technique and space multiplexing are able to provide additional key 
space in the proposed method. 
To avoid an interferometric scheme in conventional PC-DRPE 
techniques, a PC-DRPE technique that only requires the photon-limited 
amplitude of the encrypted image for decryption is also proposed. The DRPE 
is used to encrypt an image generating a complex image. PC technique is 
applied to the amplitude of the encrypted image generating a sparse noise-like 
image; however, the phase information is not retained. By not using the phase 
information, the encryption process is simplified allowing for intensity 
detection and also less information to be recorded. Using a phase numerically 
generated from the correct encryption keys together with the photon-limited 
amplitude of the encrypted image, the image can be decrypted. Moreover, 
nonlinear correlation algorithms can be used to authenticate the decrypted 
image. Both amplitude-based and full-phase encryption using the proposed 
method are investigated. 










4.1   Cryptanalysis and improvement of an asymmetric 
cryptosystem based on PTFT 
DRPE scheme is a linear symmetric cryptosystem. In recent year, an 
asymmetric cryptosystem based on PTFT was proposed [18]. The linearity of 
the DRPE scheme is removed by a nonlinear operation of phase and amplitude 
truncations. However, this method is found to be vulnerable to a specific [19] 
and a new method [20] of attack based on iterative phase retrieval algorithms. 
In this research work, an improved method of attack on the PTFT-
based asymmetric cryptosystem using a novel median-filtering phase retrieval 
method is proposed. With this method, the attacker is able to obtain precise 
attack results. The proposed method is able to produce a better quality image 
with a smaller iteration number and computation time compared to previous 
results reported in [19, 20]. Based on the proposed method of attack, a new 
cryptosystem is further proposed. Unlike the traditional phase-truncated-based 
systems, the proposed cryptosystem does not require truncated phases. 
 
4.1.1   Asymmetric cryptosystem based on PTFT 
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Firstly, the asymmetric cryptosystem based on PTFT reviewed [18]. An 
original image ( , )f x y  is encrypted into a noise-like image ( , )C x y  through 
two random phase masks (RPMs) 1( , )R x y  and 2 ( , )R u v using the following 
equations: 
 
1( , ) PT{FT[ ( , ) ( , )]},g u v f x y R x y                                                               (4.1) 
2( , ) PT{IFT[ ( , ) ( , )]}.C x y g u v R u v                                                              (4.2) 
 
where PT{} denotes a phase truncation operator. In the PTFT-based 
cryptosystem, the encryption keys are regarded as public keys and are not 
employed in the decryption process. The decryption keys are given by 
 
1 2( , ) PR{IFT[ ( , ) ( , )]}.P x y g u v R u v                                                             (4.3) 
2 1( , ) PR{FT[ ( , ) ( , )]},P u v f x y R x y                                                              (4.4) 
 
where PR{} denotes a phase reservation operator. It is seen that the decryption 
keys 1( , )P x y  and 2 ( , )P u v  are different from the encryption keys 1( , )R x y  and 
2 ( , )R u v . 
As can the seen from Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4), the decryption keys are 
related to the original image, which means that every image has unique 
decryption keys. Hence, it is immune to various known-plaintext (ciphertext) 
attacks to which the DRPE is vulnerable. In the cryptanalysis of the PTFT-
based cryptosystem, it is assumed that the ciphertext and the two public keys 
are known to the attacker. Based on known conditions, the attacker would be 
able to retrieve the decryption keys and an image which is then compared with 
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the original image to test the performance of attacks. The process is shown in 
Fig. 4.1. The cryptanalysis of the PTFT-based cryptosystem was first reported 
by Wang and Zhao in 2012 [19] who have shown that the PTFT-based 
cryptosystem is vulnerable to a specific method of attack. The method of 
attack is using a two-step phase retrieval algorithm [19], and can be briefly 
described as follows: an amplitude ( , )g u v , which is an estimate of ( , )g u v , is 
first obtained using 2 ( , )R u v  and ciphertext ( , )C x y ; an estimate of the 
plaintext, ( , )I x y , is then obtained using ( , )g u v  and 1( , )R x y . In 2014, a new 
method of attack [20], using a modified amplitude-phase retrieval algorithm, 
was proposed to simultaneously obtain the plaintext and two decryption keys. 
However, the quality of the images retrieved in the two types of attacks is poor, 

















Fig. 4.1  A flow chart of an attack process. 
 


















Yes, go to 
cycle B
( , )ng u v
( , )nP u v ( , )nP u v
( , )ng u v
PT
( , )nI u v ( , )nI u v
Convergence?

















( , )ng u v
( , )nP u v ( , )nP u v
( , )ng u v
PT
Convergence?
( , )C x y




( , )nI u v
 
(b) 
Fig. 4.2  (a) Flow chart of cycle A; (b) flow chart of cycle B. 
 
4.1.2   Improved method of attack 
In this section, an improved method of attack on the PTFT-based cryptosystem 
is proposed. The block diagrams of the proposed algorithm are shown in Figs. 
4.2(a) and (b), where two public keys, RPM1 and RPM2, and a plaintext are 
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used as constraints in the iterative process. The proposed algorithm is 
described as follows: 
Cycle A: 
1. A random distribution 
1( , )I x y  is used as an initial estimation of the 
plaintext. At the thn iteration, an image ( , )nI x y  is bonded with RPM1 
[ 1( , )R x y ] and a Fourier transform is performed. The amplitude and phase of 
the spectrum are given by 
 
1( , ) PT{FT[ ( , ) ( , )]},n ng u v I x y R x y                                                             (4.5) 
1( , ) PR{FT[ ( , ) ( , )]},n nP u v I x y R x y                                                             (4.6) 
 
2. The amplitude function ( , )ng u v  shown in Eq. (4.5) is multiplied by 
RPM2 [ 2 ( , )R u v ] and an inverse Fourier transform is performed. The 
amplitude and phase of the spectrum are obtained as 
 
2( , ) PT{IFT[ ( , ) ( , )]},n nC x y g u v R u v                                                           (4.7) 
2( , ) PR{IFT[ ( , ) ( , )]},n nP x y g u v R u v                                                           (4.8) 
 
3. The phase ( , )nP x y  shown in Eq. (4.8) is multiplied by ciphertext 
( , )C x y  and a Fourier transform is performed: 
 
( , ) PT{FT[ ( , ) ( , )]},n ng u v C x y P x y                                                              (4.9) 
 
4. The amplitude ( , )ng u v  is multiplied by the phase ( , )nP u v  shown in 
Eq. (4.6) and an inverse Fourier transform is performed: 




( , ) PT{IFT[ ( , ) ( , )]}.n n nI x y g u v P u v                                                          (4.10) 
 
5. A median-pass filtering operation is performed on ( , )nI x y  and a 
new estimate of the plaintext is obtained as 
 
( , ) MFilter[ ( , )].n nI x y I x y                                                                         (4.11) 
 
where MFilter[]  indicates a median filtering function. ( , )nI x y  is 
subsequently employed as a new estimate for ( , )nI x y  in Eq. (4.5). 
An error threshold value expressed as follows is used 
 
2
1 1Error ( , ) ( , ) ,n nI x y I x y                                                               (4.12) 
 
When the error or iterative number reaches a preset threshold value, the 
iteration in cycle A is terminated. Figure 4.2(a) shows the flowchart for the 
process of cycle A.  
Cycle B: 
Once the conditions in cycle A are met, the filtering operation shown in Eq. 
(4.11) is removed and a new iterative process begins. Assuming that there are 
k iterations before cycle A is terminated, ( , )nI x y , n=k is employed as an 
initial estimate of the plaintext in another iterative process (cycle B). 
1. An image ( , )nI x y  is combined with 1( , )R x y  and a Fourier 
transform is performed. The amplitude and phase of the spectrum are given by 
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1( , ) PT{FT[ ( , ) ( , )]},n ng u v I x y R x y                                                           (4.13) 
1( , ) PR{FT[ ( , ) ( , )]},n nP u v I x y R x y                                                           (4.14) 
 
2. The amplitude ( , )ng u v  shown in Eq. (4.13) is multiplied by 
2 ( , )R u v  and an inverse Fourier transform is performed. The amplitude and 
phase of the spectrum are given by 
 
2( , ) PT{IFT[ ( , ) ( , )]},n nC x y g u v R u v                                                          (4.15) 
2( , ) PR{IFT[ ( , ) ( , )]},n nP x y g u v R u v                                                          (4.16) 
 
3. The phase ( , )nP x y  shown in Eq. (4.16) is multiplied by ciphertext 
( , )C x y  and a Fourier transform is performed: 
 
( , ) PT{FT[ ( , ) ( , )]},n ng u v C x y P x y                                                            (4.17) 
 
4. The amplitude ( , )ng u v  is multiplied by the phase ( , )nP u v  shown in 
Eq. (4.14) and an inverse Fourier transform is performed: 
 
( , ) PT{IFT[ ( , ) ( , )]}.n n nI x y g u v P u v                                                          (4.18) 
 
( , )nI x y  is subsequently employed as a new estimate for ( , )nI x y  in Eq. (4.13).  
An error threshold value expressed as follows is used 
 
2
2 1Error ( , ) ( , ) ,n nI x y I x y                                                              (4.19) 
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When the error or iterative number reaches a preset threshold value, the 
iteration in cycle B is terminated. ( , )nI x y  is regarded as a decrypted image 
( , )I x y . Figure 4.2(b) shows the flowchart for the process of cycle B. 
 
   
(a)                               (b) 
   
(c)                               (d) 
   
(e)                               (f) 
Fig. 4.3  (a) Grayscale original image; (b) binary original image; (c) RPM1; (d) 
RPM2; (e) encrypted image from (a); (f) encrypted image from (b). 
 
4.1.3   Results and discussion 
4.1.3.1   Simulated Results 
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A numerical simulation is carried out to examine the feasibility and 
effectiveness of the proposed method of attack. Two types of normalized 
images, a grayscale and a binary image (256256 pixels), as shown in Figs. 
4.3(a) and (b), are used as images to be encrypted. Two public keys ( 1( , )R x y  
and 2 ( , )R u v ) are shown in Figs. 4.3(c) and (d). The encrypted ciphertexts 
produced by the cryptosystem based on PTFT, corresponding to Figs. 4.3(a) 
and (b), are shown in Figs. 4.3(e) and (f), respectively. 
To examine the validity of the proposed method of attack, two 
plaintext images have been retrieved using the corresponding ciphertexts and 
two public keys. A mean square error (MSE) and correlation coefficient (CC) 
are used to evaluate the similarity between the retrieved image ( , )I x y  and the 
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where M N  is the size of the image and E denotes the expected value. In the 
simulation process, iterations would be terminated when the number of 
iterations reaches a preset threshold value. The iteration number in cycle A is 
set at 40 and filtering is performed with a 3×3 neighborhood median filter. 
Figures 4.4(a) and (b) show the retrieved grayscale images with total iteration 
numbers of 50 and 200, respectively. The MSE value between Fig. 4.4(a) and 
the original grayscale image is 4.2971×10
-4
 while the MSE value between Fig. 
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4.4(b) and the original grayscale image is 1.9775×10
-4
. The CC values for Figs. 
4.4(a) and (b) are 0.9949 and 0.9977, respectively. Binary images retrieved 
with total iteration numbers of 50 and 102 are shown in Figs. 4.4(c) and (d), 





, respectively and the corresponding CC values are 0.9997 and 
1.000, respectively. It is seen that the retrieved images are of good quality 
which shows that the plaintext images have been retrieved precisely. 
 
   
(a)                               (b) 
   
(c)                               (d) 
Fig. 4.4  (a) Retrieved grayscale images corresponding to different number of 
iterations: (a) 50; (b) 200. Retrieved binary images corresponding to 
different number of iterations: (c) 50; (d) 102. 
 
The effectiveness of the proposed method of attack is also 
demonstrated with a test in convergence. Figures 4.5(a) and (b), which 
correspond to a grayscale and a binary image respectively, show the relation 
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between the MSE values and number of iterations employed in the iterative 
process. Figures 4.5(c) and (d), which correspond to a grayscale and a binary 
image respectively, show the relation between the CC values and number of 
iterations employed in the iterative process. 
 
































    (a)                                                             (b) 































(c)                                                             (d) 
Fig. 4.5  Relation between MSE values and iteration numbers using different 
attack methods: (a) MSE values of grayscale image; (b) MSE values 
of binary image. Relation between CC values and iteration numbers 
using different attack methods: (c) CC values of grayscale image; (d) 
CC values of binary image. 
 




(a)                (b) 
  
(c)                (d) 
Fig. 4.6  (a) Retrieved grayscale image with the minimum value of MSE in a 
specific attack; (b) retrieved binary image with 200 iterations in a 
specific attack; (c) retrieved grayscale image with 200 iterations in a 
new method of attack; (d) retrieved binary image with 200 iterations 
in a new method of attack. 
 
The specific attack [19] and new attack [20] are also used for 
comparison as shown in Fig. 4.5. Note that the dashed lines in Fig.4.5 show 
the MSE and CC values of the specific attack in the second step (the iteration 
number in the first step is set at 300). Comparing the MSE values of different 
attacks in Figs. 4.5(a) and (b), it is seen that the proposed method of attack 
indicates a significantly lower MSE value with a faster convergence rate. The 
corresponding CC values in Figs. 4.5(c) and (d) also indicate that the proposed 
method of attack has a faster convergent rate with a higher CC value. In the 
specific attack, when the number of iterations in the second step reaches 30, 
the MSE value for the grayscale image reaches a minimum value of 0.0328, 
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and the corresponding retrieved image is shown in Fig. 4.6(a). The retrieved 
binary image corresponding to an iteration number of 200, which has a MSE 
value of 0.1163, is shown in Fig. 4.6(b). For the new attack, the retrieved 
grayscale and binary images with an iteration number of 200 are shown in 
Figs. 4.6(c) and (d) respectively, and the corresponding MSE values are 
0.0141 and 0.1229. It can be seen from Figs. 4.6(a)–(d) that the quality of 
retrieved images in the specific and new attacks is not good and does not 
contain sufficiently useful information. 
The decryption time of the proposed method is also compared with the 
specific and new attacks. The results for the grayscale and binary images are 
shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, respectively (on an Intel Core i5-3570 3.40 GHz, 
RAM 8GB computer). It can be seen that the proposed method is able to 
produce a better quality image with a smaller iteration number and 
computation time. The above results illustrate that the performance of the 
proposed method of attack is much better than that of the specific and new 
attacks, especially in binary images. 
 
Table 4.1  Comparison of CC, MSE and computation time of different 
methods of attack on a grayscale image. 
 
Algorithms Iterations CC value MSE value Time(s) 
Specific attack [19] 300 (first step) 
30 (second step) 
0.6242 0.0328 1.882 
New attack [20] 200 0.8236 0.0141 1.863 
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Table 4.2  Comparison of CC, MSE and computation time of different 
methods of attack on a binary image. 
 
Algorithms Iterations CC value MSE value Time(s) 
Specific attack [19] 300 (first step) 
200 (second step) 
0.3736 0.1163 2.798 
New attack [20] 200 0.3496 0.1229 1.864 




4.1.3.2   Robustness analysis 
As ciphertext may be contaminated by noise or occlusion in practical 
applications, the performance of the proposed method against noise- and 
occlusion-contaminations is also examined. The performances of specific and 
new attacks are also used for comparison. A ciphertext with noise 
contamination is first examined. White Gaussian noises with zero mean and 
different standard deviations are introduced in the ciphertext. The CC values 
between a decrypted and original image are presented. Figures 4.7(a) and (b) 
show the CC values against varying standard deviations (varying from 0 to 0.1 
with an increment of 0.02) for a grayscale and binary image respectively. It 
can be seen that the CC values of the proposed method are much larger than 
the other two methods. As an example, Fig. 4.8 shows decrypted images of a 
noisy ciphertext with a standard deviation of 0.06. Figures 4.8(a)–(c) show 
decrypted grayscale images of the proposed, new and specific attacks 
respectively with corresponding CC values of 0.6892, 0.5407 and 0.3759 
while Figs. 4.8(d)–(f) show decrypted binary images of the proposed, new and 
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specific attacks respectively with corresponding CC values of 0.8436, 0.2767 
and 0.2537. It can be seen from Figs. 4.7 and 4.8 that the proposed method of 
attack is more robust against noise contamination, especially in binary images. 
 

































Fig. 4.7  (a) CC values against different Gaussian noises in a grayscale image 
using different methods of attack; (b) CC values against different 
Gaussian noises in a binary image using different methods of attack. 
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(a)                              (b)                                (c) 
   
(d)                              (e)                                (f) 
Fig. 4.8  Decrypted grayscale images from a noisy ciphertext with a standard 
deviation of 0.06: (a) in proposed method of attack, (b) new method 
of attack and (c) specific method of attack; decrypted binary images 
from a noisy ciphertext with a standard deviation of 0.06 (d) in 
proposed method of attack, (e) new method of attack and (f) specific 
method of attack. 
 
The ciphertext is also examined with occlusion contamination and Figs. 
4.9(a) and (b) show the CC values against different occlusions (varying from 0 
to 10% with an increment of 2%) at the top-left corner of a ciphertext, for 
grayscale and binary images respectively. Figure 4.10 shows decrypted images 
of a ciphertext with a 6% occlusion. Figures 4.10(a)–(c) show decrypted 
grayscale images using the proposed, new and specific attacks respectively 
with corresponding CC values of 0.4939, 0.3789 and 0.2548 while Figs. 
4.10(d)–(f) show decrypted binary images using the proposed, new and 
specific attacks respectively with corresponding CC values of 0.6902, 0.2540 
and 0.2150. As can be seen, data loss due to occlusion results in the 
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appearance of noises randomly distributed across the decrypted images. It can 
be seen from Figs. 4.9 and 4.10 that the proposed attack is also more robust 
against occlusion, especially in binary images. Thus, the results show that the 
proposed method of attack is more robust against noise- and occlusion- 
contaminations than the specific and new attacks. 
 


































Fig. 4.9  (a) CC values against different occlusions in a grayscale image; (b) 
CC values against different occlusions in a binary image. 
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(a)                              (b)                                (c) 
   
(d)                              (e)                                (f) 
Fig. 4.10  Decrypted grayscale images of a ciphertext with a 6% occlusion: (a) 
in proposed method of attack, (b) new method of attack and (c) 
specific method of attack; decrypted binary images of a ciphertext 
with a 6% occlusion: (d) in proposed method of attack, (e) new 
method of attack and (f) specific method of attack. 
 
4.1.4   Cryptosystem based on the proposed method of attack 
Different methods of attack are used to compromise the security of encryption 
systems; however they also provide opportunities for the design of new 
encryption systems [124, 125]. Based on the proposed method of attack, in 
which a plaintext can be decrypted precisely from a ciphertext by using only 
two encryption keys, a new encryption system is further developed. The 
encryption process is similar to that of a traditional PTFT-based cryptosystem, 
except that in the proposed method, truncated phases are not required. During 
encryption, a plaintext is combined with a RPM and a Fourier transform is 
performed. The phase is then truncated and its amplitude is recorded. 
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Subsequently the recorded amplitude is combined with another RPM, and an 
inverse Fourier transform is performed. The phase is again truncated and its 
amplitude is recorded as a ciphertext. Figure 4.11 shows the flowchart of the 
encryption process. 
1( , )R x y  and 2 ( , )R u v  are two RPMs and regarded as 
secret keys. The equations used in the encryption process are shown in Eqs. 
(4.1) and (4.2). For decryption, the phase retrieval algorithm described in 
section 4.1.2 is used and the plaintext can be decrypted precisely from the 
ciphertext by using only the two secret keys. The simulated results are the 










Fig. 4.11  Flow chart of proposed encryption process. 
 
Owing to the nonlinearity of phase truncation, the security of the 
proposed cryptosystem is improved. The proposed system would be immune 
to attacks that other DRPE cryptosystems are vulnerable to. To further 
demonstrate the robustness of the proposed encryption system, the following 
example shows decrypted images when the ciphertext and one secret key has 
been intercepted. Figure 4.12(a) shows a decrypted image using the actual 
RPM1 and an incorrect RPM2; Fig. 4.12(b) shows a decrypted image using an 
incorrect RPM1 and the actual RPM2. From the results it is seen that no useful 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
89 
information on the plaintext image [compared with the actual image in Fig. 
4.3(a)] can be observed. 
 
   
(a)                               (b) 
Fig. 4.12 (a) Decrypted image using the actual RPM1 and an incorrect RPM2; 
(b) decrypted image using an incorrect RPM1 and the actual RPM2. 
 
Unlike the cryptosystem based on PTFT which requires truncated 
phases using complicated interferometry during encryption, the proposed 
method does not require truncated phases and amplitudes are recorded by a 
CCD directly. In addition, since truncated phases are used as decryption keys 
in the PTFT-based cryptosystems, they would encounter information 
disclosure problem [64, 65] and are susceptible to known public key attacks. 
However, the proposed encryption system does not contain these deficiencies, 
i.e., there is no risk of information disclosure and is immune to existing attacks. 
Compared with the previous method reported in [126], the decryption 
process in the proposed method is much simpler since the transport of 
intensity equation (TIE) is not required; in addition, it has a wider applications, 
i.e., there is no distance limitation and it can be applied to different domains. 
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4.2   Cryptanalysis and improvement of an asymmetric 
cryptosystem based on EMD 
In addition to the PTFT-based asymmetric cryptosystems, a new asymmetric 
cryptosystem based on equal modulus decomposition (EMD), which is free 
from the silhouette problem and is robust against specific attack, has also been 
proposed recently [66]. 
In this research work, a cryptanalysis of an EMD-based cryptosystem 
is presented and it is shown that the system is vulnerable to a newly designed 
attack. With the attack, an attacker is able to obtain precise results with only a 
few iterations. In addition, a security enhanced asymmetric cryptosystem 
based on a random decomposition (RD) technique and a 4-f optical system is 
proposed. The improvement significantly enhances the security of the system. 
 
4.2.1   Asymmetric cryptosystem based on EMD 
The procedure for optical encryption based on coherent superposition and 
EMD [66] can be summarized as follows. Let ( , )I x y  denote the intensity 
distribution of an image to be encrypted. A function ( , )I u v  can be 
constructed as: 
 
( , ) FT{ ( , ) ( , )]},I u v I x y R x y                                                                  (4.22) 
 
where ( , )R x y  denotes a random phase mask. As shown in Fig. 4.13, ( , )I u v  
is divided into two masks 1( , )P u v  and 2 ( , )P u v , with equal modulus. A 
function ( , )u v  can be written as 
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1( , ) 2 rand( , ) arg{ ( , )},u v u v P u v                                                           (4.23) 
 
where rand( , )u v  is a random function distributed in [0, 1] and arg{} denotes 
the argument of a function. The amplitude and phase of ( , )I u v  are given by 
( , ) | ( , ) |A u v I u v  and ( , ) arg{ ( , )}u v I u v  , respectively. From simple 
geometrical deduction, masks 1( , )P u v  and 2 ( , )P u v  are given by: 
 
1
( , ) / 2
( , ) exp{ ( , )},
cos[ ( , ) ( , )]
A u v
P u v i u v





                                           (4.24) 
2
( , ) / 2
( , ) exp{ [2 ( , ) ( , )]}.
cos[ ( , ) ( , )]
A u v
P u v i u v u v















Fig. 4.13  Schematic representation of equal modulus decomposition. 
 
In the cryptosystem, two encryption keys ( , )R x y  and ( , )u v  are 
employed as public keys. 1( , )P u v  is considered as a ciphertext and 2 ( , )P u v  a 
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private key. With masks 1( , )P u v  and 2 ( , )P u v , the original image is retrieved 
from the following equation: 
 
1 2
1 2( , ) | FT { ( , ) ( , )}|I x y P u v P u v
                                                              (4.26) 
 
It is worth noting that since the modulus of ciphertext 1( , )P u v  is equal to that 
of private key 2 ( , )P u v , the ciphertext will reveal the information on the 
private key. This will lead to a security flaw in an optical encryption scheme 
based on EMD. 
 
4.2.2  New method of attack 
4.2.2.1   Theoretical analysis 
From the cryptanalysis, it is shown that the EMD-based cryptosystem is 
vulnerable to an attack based on a phase retrieval algorithm. From the EMD-
based cryptosystem, the following equation can be obtained: 
 
1 2FT{ ( , ) ( , )} ( , ) ( , )I x y R x y P u v P u v                                                     (4.27) 
 
Based on the principles of EMD, the modulus of mask 1( , )P u v  is equal to that 
of mask 2 ( , )P u v . 2 ( , )P u v  can thus be written as 
2 1( , ) | ( , ) | exp[ ( , )]P u v P u v i u v , where ( , )u v  is the phase of 2 ( , )P u v . 
With knowledge of ciphertext 1( , )P u v  and public key ( , )R x y , the 
plaintext and private key can be obtained by employing the following iterative 
phase retrieval procedure: 
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1. To perform the iteration, an initial estimate 
1| ( , ) | exp[ 2 ( , )]P u v i rand u v  for private key 2 ( )P u  is first assigned. At the 
thk iteration, ciphertext 1( , )P u v  is superposed by 2 ( , )P u v  and an inverse 
Fourier transform is performed to obtain an estimated plaintext: 
 
( ) 1 2
1 2( , ) | FT { ( , ) ( , )}|
kI x y P u v P u v                                                           (4.28) 
 
2. A median-pass filtering operation is then performed on ( ) ( , )kI x y  
and a new estimate of the plaintext is obtained as: 
 
( ) ( )( , ) MFilter[ ( , )].k kI x y I x y                                                                    (4.29) 
 
where MFilter[]  indicates a median filtering function. 
3. The estimated plaintext ( ) ( , )kI x y  is multiplied by a function 
( , )R x y  and a Fourier transform is performed to obtain the Fourier spectrum at 
the mask plane: 
 
( ) ( )( , ) FT{ ( , ) ( , )},k kI u v I x y R x y                                                            (4.30) 
 
4. The ciphertext 1( , )P u v  is subtracted from the spectrum 
( ) ( , )kI u v  to 
establish the complex amplitude at the mask plane of 2 ( , )P u v : 
 
( ) ( )
2 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ),
k kP u v I u v P u v                                                                     (4.31) 
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5. The amplitude of ( )
2 ( , )
kP u v  is then substituted with the amplitude 
1| ( , ) |P u v , while preserving the phase: 
 
  ( 1) ( ) ( )
2 1 2 2( , ) | ( , ) | [ ( , ) | ( , ) |].
k k kP u v P u v P u v P u v                                           (4.32) 
 
6. Steps 1-5 (cycle A) is repeated and when the iteration number or the 
error 
2
( 1) ( )
1 2 2Error | ( , ) | | ( , ) |
k kP u v P u v      reaches a preset threshold 
value, the iteration in cycle A is terminated. 
7. Once the conditions at step 6 are fulfilled, the filtering operation at 
step 2 is removed and a new iterative procedure (cycle B) begins. When the 
iteration number or the error 
2
( 1) ( )
2 2 2Error | ( , ) | | ( , ) |
k kP u v P u v      in 
cycle B reaches a preset threshold value, the iteration is terminated. MSE 






MSE ( , ) ( , )
M N
x y






                                                      (4.33) 
 
where M N  is the size of the image. 
 
4.2.2.2   Simulated Results 
A numerical simulation is conducted to examine the feasibility and 
effectiveness of the proposed method. A gray-scale and a binary image 
(256256 pixels), as shown in Figs. 4.14(a) and (b) respectively, are used as 
original images. Figures 4.14(c) and (d) show respectively two public keys 
[ ( , )R x y  and ( , )u v ] used in the encryption process. The encrypted 
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ciphertexts produced by the EMD-based cryptosystem, corresponding to Figs. 
4.14(a) and (b), are shown in Figs. 4.14(e) and (f), respectively. It can be seen 
in Figs. 4.14(e) and (f) that the plaintext images are fully encrypted in the 
ciphertexts. 
 
   
(a)                               (b) 
   
(c)                               (d) 
   
(e)                               (f) 
Fig. 4.14  (a) A gray-scale original image; (b) a binary original image; (c) 
function R(x, y); (d) function ( , )u v ; (e) real part of an encrypted 
image of (a); (f) real part of an encrypted image of (b). 
 




              
 
 
            (a)                                             (b) 
Fig. 4.15  (a) Relation between MSE values and iteration numbers for a gray-
scale image; (b) retrieved gray-scale image with an iteration number 
of 100. 
 
To show the effectiveness of the proposed method, two plaintext 
images are retrieved from the corresponding ciphertexts and public key 
( , )R x y . In the simulation process, the iteration number in cycle A is set at 20. 
Figure 4.15(a) shows the relation between the MSE values and number of 
iterations employed for a gray-scale image. It can be seen that the proposed 
method exhibits a rapid convergence and the MSE value is close to zero 
within only a few iterations. Figures 4.15(b) shows a retrieved gray-scale 
image with an iteration number of 100. The MSE value between Fig. 4.15(b) 
and the original gray-scale image is 7.7134×10
-5
 while the correlation 
coefficient (CC) between Fig. 4.15(b) and the original gray-scale image is 
0.9991. It can be seen that the retrieved gray-scale image is of excellent 
quality which means that the plaintext is retrieved precisely. Figure 4.16(a) 
shows the relation between the MSE values and number of iterations 
employed for a binary image. It also shows that the MSE value is close to zero 
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after only a few iterations. Figure 4.16(b) shows a retrieved binary image with 
an iteration number of 100. The MSE and CC values for Fig. 4.16(b) are 
3.3714×10
-10
 and 1.0000, respectively. The values indicate that the plaintext 
image has been retrieved precisely. The above results illustrate the severity of 
the proposed method of attack on the EMD-based asymmetric cryptosystem. 
 
 
       
 
               (a)                                                (b) 
Fig. 4.16  (a) Relation between MSE values and iteration numbers for a binary 
image; (b) retrieved binary image with an iteration number of 100. 
 
4.2.3   Security enhanced cryptosystem based on random decomposition 
4.2.3.1  Theoretical analysis 
In view of the above described vulnerability of the EMD-based asymmetric 
cryptosystem to the newly designed method of attack, a security enhanced 
cryptosystem is further investigated. In the above cryptanalysis, since the 
moduli of the ciphertext and private key are equal, they are employed as 
constraints in the attack process. The proposed security enhanced method is 
based on a RD and a 4-f system. RD is a process that divides a Fourier 
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spectrum into two complex-value masks randomly. Let ( , )I x y  denotes the 
intensity distribution of an image to be encrypted. A function 1( , )I u v  can be 
constructed as: 
 












Fig. 4.17  Schematic representation of random decomposition. 
 
The function 1( , )I u v  can be represented in a 2D coordinate system as shown 
in Fig. 4.17, where 1( , )u v  and 1( , )u v  are given by 1( , )u v = 2 rand( , )u v , 
1( , )u v = 2 rand( , )u v . The amplitude and phase of 1( , )I u v  are given by 
1 1( , ) | ( , ) |A u v I u v  and 1 1( , ) arg{ ( , )}u v I u v  , respectively. From simple 
geometrical deduction, masks 1( , )P u v  and 1( , )P u v  are given by: 
 






( , ) sin[ ( , )]
( , ) exp{ [ ( , ) ( , )]},
sin[ ( , ) ( , )]
A u v u v
P u v i u v u v











( , ) sin[ ( , )]
( , ) exp{ [ ( , ) ( , )]}.
sin[ ( , ) ( , )]
A u v u v
P u v i u v u v





   

                      (4.36) 
 
An inverse Fourier transform is performed on 1( , )P u v  to obtain 2 ( , )I x y : 
 
-1
2 1( , ) FT { ( , )}.I x y P u v                                                                               (4.37) 
 
2 ( )I x  is further divided into two masks 2 ( , )P x y  and 3( , )P x y  using 2 ( , )x y  
and 2 ( , )x y  as encryption keys (where 2 ( , )x y = 2 rand( , )x y , 





( , ) sin[ ( , )]
( , ) exp{ [ ( , ) ( , )]},
sin[ ( , ) ( , )]
A x y x y
P x y i x y x y











( , ) sin[ ( , )]
( , ) exp{ [ ( , ) ( , )]},
sin[ ( , ) ( , )]
A x y x y
P x y i x y x y







                  (4.39) 
 
where 2 2( , ) | ( , ) |A x y I x y  and 2 2( , ) arg{ ( , )}x y I x y  . The encryption 
process described above is further illustrated in a flowchart shown in Fig. 
4.18(a). In the proposed cryptosystem, 3( , )P x y  is used as a ciphertext while 
2 ( , )P x y  and 1( , )P u v  are employed as private keys. 
In the decryption process, using the principles of RD, we have: 
 
3 2 2( , ) ( , ) ( , ),P x y P x y I x y                                                                        (4.40) 
1 1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ).P u v P u v I u v                                                                            (4.41) 








3 2 1( , ) | FT {FT[ ( , ) ( , )] ( , )}| .I x y P x y P x y P u v

































Fig. 4.18  Proposed asymmetric cryptosystem based on random decomposition 
and 4-f system: (a) a flowchart of the encryption process; (b) 
schematic setup of the optical decryption process. 
 
Using Eq. (4.42), the original image can be retrieved. Figure 4.18(b) 
shows the optical setup for the decryption process. The system is illuminated 
with a collimated laser beam and the ciphertext or decryption key is displayed 
via two spatial light modulators mounted together (one displays the amplitude 
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while the other displays the phase). A Fourier transform is performed on 
encrypted image 3( , )P x y  and private key 2 ( , )P x y  via Lens 1. The two 
Fourier spectrums subsequently interfere with each other resulting in an 
intermediate function 1( , )P u v . An inverse Fourier transform is then performed 
on the intermediate function 1( , )P u v  and private key 1( , )P u v  via Lens 2. The 
two spectrums emerging from Lens 2 then interfere with each other resulting 
in a decrypted image ( , )I x y , which is recorded by a CCD camera. 
 
4.2.3.2   Results and  discussion 
A numerical simulation is conducted to examine the effectiveness of the 
proposed method. Figure 4.14(a) is used as an original image and is encrypted 
into a ciphertext 3( , )P x y  as shown in Fig. 4.19(a). No useful information can 
be observed. Private keys 2 ( , )P x y  and 1( , )P u v  generated in the encryption 
process are shown in Figs. 4.19(b) and (c), respectively. Using the private keys, 
a decrypted image with a CC value of 1 is shown in Fig. 4.19(d). This 
indicates that the original image has been reproduced accurately. 
The security of the enhanced cryptosystem is examined using various 
keys for decryption. Figure 4.20(a) shows a decrypted image using a correct 
1( , )P u v  key but an incorrect 2 ( , )P x y  key. Figure 4.20(b) shows a decrypted 
image using a correct 2 ( , )P x y  key but an incorrect 1( , )P u v  key. It can be seen 
that in both cases no useful information were retrieved. This shows that an 
image cannot be decrypted if one of the private keys is wrong. 
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(a)                               (b) 
   
(c)                               (d) 
Fig. 4.19  (a) Ciphertext 3( , )P x y  (real part); (b) private key 2 ( , )P x y  (real 
part); (c) private key 1( , )P u v  (real part); (d) decrypted image. 
 
 
   
(a)                               (b) 
Fig. 4.20  (a) Decrypted image using an incorrect 2 ( , )P x y  function; (b) 
decrypted image using an incorrect 1( , )P u v  function. 
 
The proposed cryptosystem keeps the advantage of a one-way trap 
door function generated by RD. It is seen from Eqs. (4.34)–(4.39) that 
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different images correspond to different private keys, which implies that the 
proposed method would be immune to attacks that other symmetric DRPE 
cryptosystems are vulnerable to. As an example, a known-plaintext attack is 
employed to crack the system and a retrieved image is shown in Fig. 4.21(a). 
It can be seen that no useful information has been obtained. 
 
   
(a)                               (b) 











    (c) 
Fig. 4.21  (a) Known-plaintext attack on the proposed system; (b) a retrieved 
image after 300 iterations; (c) relation between MSE values and 
iteration numbers. 
 
The proposed method’s robustness against the newly designed attack 
that the EMD-based cryptosystem is vulnerable to (as described in section 
4.2.2) is also studied. Since the enhanced cryptosystem is based on a 4-f 
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system, the attack process is completed in two steps described as follows: in 
the first step mask 1( , )P u v  is retrieved using ciphertext ( , )C x y ; in the second 
step an estimation of a plaintext ( , )I x y  is obtained using 1( , )P u v  and ( , )R x y . 
However, since the phase at the mask 1( , )P u v  plane, and modulus of the 
private keys are not known, there would be insufficient information in the 
iterative phase retrieval process and the attack cannot be successfully carried 
out. Figure 4.21(b) shows an image retrieved after 300 iterations. It is seen that 
even with a large number of iterations no useful information is retrieved. 
Figure 4.21(c) shows the relation between the MSE values (between the 
retrieved image and original image) and number of iterations employed in the 
second step. It is seen that a larger iteration number results in a poorer quality 
of the image retrieved. The results thus illustrate the security of the enhanced 
cryptosystem. 
It should also be noted that in the proposed cryptosystem, the original 
image is hidden in masks 1( , )P u v , 2 ( , )P x y  and 3( , )P x y . If any of the masks 
is not used during decryption, correct information on the original image cannot 
be retrieved. Figures 4.22(a)–(f) show images retrieved using only one or two 
masks. It can be seen that no useful information is revealed if any of the three 
masks is not employed. This indicates that the proposed cryptosystem does not 
exhibit a silhouette problem. 
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(a)                              (b)                                (c) 
   
(d)                              (e)                                (f) 
Fig. 4.22  (a) Decrypted image using mask 1( , )P u v ; (b) decrypted image using 
mask 2 ( , )P x y ; (c) decrypted image using mask 3( , )P x y ; (d) 
decrypted image using masks 1( , )P u v  and 2 ( , )P x y ; (e) decrypted 
image using masks 1( , )P u v  and 3( , )P x y ; (f) decrypted image using 
masks 2 ( , )P x y  and 3( , )P x y . 
 
The robustness of the proposed method against noise- and occlusion-
contaminations is also investigated. White Gaussian noises with zero mean 
and varying standard deviations are included in a ciphertext to study the 
robustness of the system against noise. Figures 4.23(a) and (b) show a noise 
contaminated ciphertext with standard deviations of 0.1 and 0.2, respectively. 
The corresponding decrypted images with MSE values of 0.0049 and 0.0194 
are shown in Figs. 4.23(c) and (d), respectively. The decrypted images contain 
most of the information on the original image and hence demonstrates the 
robustness of the proposed system against noise. The proposed system is also 
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examined with occlusion contamination. Figures 4.24(a) and (b) show 
ciphertexts contaminated with 10% and 20% occlusions, respectively. The 
occluded pixels are replaced with values of zeros. The corresponding 
decrypted images are shown in Figs. 4.24(c) and (d), respectively. It is seen 
that the occlusions would result in a loss of data in the occluded portion of the 
ciphertext. However, the unoccluded portions would still remain intact in the 
decrypted image. 
 
   
(a)                               (b) 
   
(c)                               (d) 
Fig. 4.23 Ciphertexts contaminated by Gaussian noise with a standard 
deviation of (a) 0.1; (b) 0.2; (c) decrypted image of ciphertext 
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(a)                               (b) 
   
(c)                               (d) 
Fig. 4.24  (a) Ciphertext with a 10% occlusion; (b) ciphertext with a 20% 
occlusion; (c) decrypted image of ciphertext shown in (a); (d) 
decrypted image of ciphertext shown in (b). 
 
4.3   Summary 
In this chapter, an improved method of attack on an asymmetric cryptosystem 
based on PTFT is proposed. With the proposed method of attack, an attacker is 
able to access the exact decryption keys and obtain precise attack results. The 
method is based on a novel median-filtering phase retrieval algorithm. 
Compared with existing attacks, the proposed attack has the following 
advantages: 1) exact information of the original image can be obtained in both 
grayscale and binary forms; 2) better computing efficiency; 3) more robust 
against noise- and occlusion- contaminations. Based on the proposed method 
of attack, a new cryptosystem, which not only enhances the security of the 
system but also does not require truncated phases, is further proposed. 
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In addition to the PTFT-based asymmetric cryptosystem, the EMD-
based asymmetric cryptosystem has been shown to be vulnerable to a newly 
designed attack as well. With this attack, an attacker is able to obtain precise 
attack results using a phase retrieval algorithm. In addition, a security 
enhanced asymmetric cryptosystem using a RD technique and a 4-f optical 
system has been proposed. In the proposed system, a RD technique is 
employed to create an effective trapdoor one-way function. As a result, it is 
able to avoid various types of attack and maintain the asymmetric 
characteristics of the cryptosystem. Numerical simulations are conducted to 









OPTICAL ENCRYPTION BY 
 PHOTON COUNTING GHOST IMAGING 
 
 
Ghost imaging has drawn wide attention recently due to its remarkable 
characteristics. Ghost imaging provides an interesting research perspective for 
optical security and effectively enriches conventional optical security field. 
Different from the before mentioned encryption schemes based on random 
phase encryption, ghost-imaging-based security system encrypts object image 
into an intensity vector [30], rather than a complex-valued matrix, which 
would be convenient in optical implementation, data transmission and storage. 
However, ghost-imaging-based security system has recently been shown to be 
vulnerable to a chosen-plaintext attack, due to the linearity of the encryption 
system [31]. It is thus desirable that nonlinear security systems based on ghost 
imaging can be developed. 
In this research work, an alternative method for optical security using 
ghost imaging with photon counting (PC) is proposed. PC technique has been 
applied in many fields, such as DRPE [35–40] and integral imaging [42]. In 
this work, PC is integrated with ghost imaging for optical security for the first 
time. A sparse ciphertext is generated by applying the PC technique to the 
encrypted distribution of ghost-imaging-based security system. PC imaging 
follows the Poisson distribution which is a nonlinear transformation unlike the 





photon-limited decoded object cannot be easily recognized by an intruder. In 
this case, additional layers of protection are provided to the proposed security 
system and would render the system more robust against attacks. Even though 
the integration of PC technique and ghost imaging is mainly intended for 
information verification, the additional possibility of object retrieval is 
presented in this work. 
 
Fig. 5.1  A schematic setup for ghost imaging. Only the object beam arm is 
illustrated and the intensity patterns at the reference beam arm are 
virtually computed. SLM, spatial light modulator. 
 
5.1   Encryption and decryption process 
Figure 5.1 shows a schematic setup for ghost imaging. A series of independent 
random phase masks are introduced on the SLM. The light passes through the 
SLM. The modified beam illuminates the object. The transmitted light is then 
collected by a bucket detector (without spatial resolution). For each phase 
mask ( )i xϕ (i=1, 2, 3, …, M), the intensity recorded by the bucket detector is 
given by 
 






where ( )f x  denotes the amplitude transmittance of the object. ( )iI x  is the 
intensity of the Fresnel diffraction field of ( )i xϕ , i.e., 
 
2( ) exp[ ( )] ( , ) ,i iI x j x h x dϕ= ⊗                                                                     (5.2) 
 
where ⊗ denotes convolution operation, and h(x,d) is the point pulse function 
of the Fresnel transform described by 
 




 =   
                                                       (5.3) 
 
where d is the Fresnel propagation distance between the SLM and the bucket 
detector plane. It is noteworthy that the intensity patterns ( )iI x  can be easily 
computed by authorized users according to Eq. (5.2), provided that the set of 
phase masks is known [100, 101]. 
In conventional ghost imaging [30, 102–108], the object is 
reconstructed by correlating the bucket detector measurements { }iB  with the 
intensity patterns ( )iI x  as 
 
1




O x B B I x
M =
= − 〈 〉∑                                                                        (5.4) 
 
where ∑ ⋅≡〈⋅〉 iM
1  denotes an ensemble average over M measurements. It can 
be seen from Eq. (5.4) that the object reconstruction is obtained by the 
superposition of the calculated (or measured) intensities iI  weighted with the 





ciphertext. Since { }iC  contains both positive and negative values, it can be 
written as a complex-valued function | | exp[ ]i i iC C jφ=  with amplitude | |iC  
and phase iφ , where iφ  equals to 0 when iC  is positive and iφ  equals to π 
when iC  is negative. 
A photon-limited ciphertext, ph{ }iC , can be generated by using a PC 
technique as described in Chapter 2. The PC technique is applied to the 
amplitude of ciphertext | |iC . The photon-limited amplitude of ciphertext, 
ph| |iC , is obtained by applying photon counting technique to the normalized 
amplitude distribution 
1
| | | |Mi i iig C C== ∑ . Only the non-zero pixels retain 
information for decryption. From the photon-limited amplitude of ciphertext 
and its corresponding phase information, a photon-limited ciphertext ph{ }iC  
(i=1, 2, 3,…, M), is obtained and used for decryption. 
The photon-limited decoded object is reconstructed by correlating the 









f x C I x
M =
= ∑                                                                                 (5.5) 
 
When a small number of photons, pN , is employed, the reconstructed object 
cannot clearly render the visual information [35–40]. Optical verification 
based on nonlinear correlation algorithms [43] is applied to authenticate the 
decoded object, ph ( )f x . The kth-law nonlinear correlation filter [35–40, 43] is 






( ) 21ph ph( ) IFT | FT[ ( )]{FT[ ( )]} | FT[ ( )]{FT[ ( )]} ,kr x f x f x f x f x∗ − ∗= ⋅              (5.6) 
 
where k denotes the strength of the applied nonlinearity and asterisk denotes 
complex conjugate. 
 
5.2   Results and discussion 
A numerical experiment is carried out to examine the feasibility and 
effectiveness of the proposed method. A collimated laser ( λ =632.8 nm) is 
used to encrypt an object. The axial distance between the SLM and the bucket 
detector plane is 30 cm. 
The object shown in Fig. 5.2(a) is encrypted using the proposed optical 
security system. When a series of random phase masks are sequentially 
embedded into the SLM, the intensity points { }iB  are correspondingly 
obtained using a bucket detector. The number of measurements is 3000, i.e., M 
= 3000. The ciphertext i i iC B B= − 〈 〉  (i=1, 2, 3, …, M) is then obtained as 
shown in Fig. 5.2(b). It is illustrated that only 1-D noisy map is obtained as 
ciphertext after the object encryption. Figure 5.2(c) shows a photon-limited 
ciphertext, ph{ }iC , with pN =100 photons or 0.0333 photons/pixel. The 
histograms of the ciphertext and photon-limited ciphertext are shown in Figs. 
5.2(d) and (e), respectively. The photon-limited ciphertext shows a very sparse 
distribution, in which most of the values are zero, and thus an effective 
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(d)                                              (e) 
Fig. 5.2  (a) Original object; (b) ciphertext; (c) photon-limited ciphertext with 
pN =100 photons (0.033 photons/pixel); (d) histogram of the 
ciphertext; (e) histogram of the photon-limited ciphertext. 
 
The photon-limited ciphertext ph{ }iC  is then used for decryption by 
using the correct security key and the decoded object ph ( )f x  is shown in Fig. 
5.3(a). This reconstructed object does not reveal the original information. 
Nonlinear correlation filter shown in Eq. (5.6) is used to authenticate the 













application, the peak to correlation energy (PCE) [36, 44] is evaluated for 




PCE max[| ( ) | ] / | ( ) | ,xN jjr x r x== ∑                                                             (5.7) 
 
where xN  is the total number of pixels in the object. Figure 5.4 shows the 
relationship between PCE values and number of photons, pN , for various k 
values when functions ph ( )f x  and ( )f x  are compared by correlation. It is 
shown that the largest PCE value can be obtained when nonlinearity strength k 
= 0.3. Thus, nonlinear parameter k = 0.3 is selected. Figure 5.3(b) shows the 
correlation result, when the decoded object in Fig. 5.3(a) is correlated with the 
original object using nonlinear parameter k = 0.3. It can be seen from Fig. 
5.3(b) that only one remarkable peak is obtained at the center over the noisy 
background, which means that the decoded object obtained using correct keys 




                            
 
 
 (a)                                       (b) 
 
Fig. 5.3  (a) Decoded object; (b) nonlinear correlation result using k = 0.3 and 




















































Fig. 5.4  PCE value versus number of photons for different nonlinearities (k). 
The values and uncertainty bars are established by running 20 






                             
 
 
(a)                                     (b) 
Fig. 5.5  (a) Reconstructed object using wrong keys with pN =100 and 
M=3000; (b) nonlinear correlation result using k = 0.3 and Fig. 
5.2(a) as the reference object. The correlation is normalized 
relative to the correct case in Fig. 5.3(b). 
 
In the proposed method, random phase mask ( )i xϕ  (i=1, 2, 3, …, M) 
are required during decoding. When a series of wrong phase masks are 
employed, the decoded object is shown in Fig. 5.5(a). The reconstructed object 
does not show any information of the object and the corresponding nonlinear 


















correlation peak. Thus the decoded object cannot be verified successfully 
without the security keys.  
 
   
















Fig. 5.6  (a) False object; (b) reconstructed object with pN =100 and M=3000; 
(c) nonlinear correlation result using k = 0.3 and Fig. 5.2(a) as the 
reference object. The correlation is normalized relative to the correct 
case in Fig. 5.3(b). 
 
In order to test the discrimination capability of the proposed method, a 
similar object ( )s x  [Fig. 5.6(a)], is encrypted based on PC ghost imaging 
system with pN =100 and M = 3000. A decoded object, ph ( )s x , with a noisy 
appearance is obtained as shown in Fig. 5.6(b). Figure 5.6(c) shows the 
corresponding correlation result, when the decoded object ph ( )s x  is correlated 
with the original object by nonlinear correlation. In this case, there is no 





results demonstrate that the proposed method owns high discrimination 
capability in object authentication. 
The optical security system based on ghost imaging [30] has been 
found vulnerable to a chosen-plaintext attack [31]. The flaw originates from 
the linearity of the encryption algorithm [31]. In the proposed encryption 
system, the linearity is broken due to PC Poisson nonlinear transformation. It 
is impossible to deduce the intensity collected by the bucket detector, iB , from 
the photon-limited ciphertext ph{ }iC  (i=1, 2, 3,…, M). In this case, the chosen-
plaintext attack [31] does not work for the proposed security system. 
To evaluate the robustness of the proposed method against 
eavesdropping, the reconstructed objects under different percentages of 
eavesdropping is investigated when an unauthorized attacker has ascertained 
some of the secret key components, i.e., ( , )i x yϕ (i=1, 2, 3,…, M). Figures 
5.7(a)–(d) show the decoded objects when 30%, 50%, 60%, 70% of the phase 
mask ( , )i x yϕ (i=1, 2, 3,…, M) are eavesdropped for the decoding, 
respectively. Figures 5.8(a)–(d) show the nonlinear correlation results 
corresponding to Figs. 5.7(a)–(d), respectively. The results show that at least 
70% of the secret key components are necessary to roughly authenticate the 
decoded object. Some standard parameters extracted from Fig. 5.3(b) can be 
further stored in a separated database and applied for the comparison during 
the authentication process to help determine if eavesdropping or 
contaminations have occurred. Thus, the proposed method achieves a high 





   
(a)                        (b) 
   
(c)                        (d) 
Fig. 5.7  Reconstructed objects with pN =100 and M=3000 when the secret 
key components are partially recovered for different eavesdropping 

























































(c)                                        (d) 
 
Fig. 5.8  Nonlinear correlation results respectively corresponding to Figs. 
5.7(a)–(d). The correlation is normalized relative to the correct case 
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(c)                                                   (d) 
Fig. 5.9  Decoded objects when the number of measurements M=20000 with 
(a) number of photons pN =1000 (0.05 photons/pixel) and (b) 
pN =5000 (0.25 photons/pixel); (c)–(d) the histogram of the photon-
limited ciphertexts respectively corresponding to Figs. 5.9(a) and (b). 
 
Even though the integration of PC technique and ghost imaging is 
mainly intended for information verification, object retrieval can also be 
achieved by increasing the number of measurements and number of photons. 
For example, when the number of measurements is increased to M = 20000, 
the decoded objects with number of photons pN =1000 (0.05 photons/pixel) 
and pN =5000 (0.25 photons/pixel) are shown in Figs. 5.9(a) and (b), 
respectively. The CC values for Figs. 5.9(a) and (b) are 0.5042 and 0.7570, 





ciphertexts corresponding to Figs. 5.9(a) and (b), respectively. It can be seen 
from Fig. 5.9 that although the reconstructed objects are visible, the 
corresponding photon-limited ciphertexts, in which most of the values are zero, 
are very sparse. The photon-limited ciphertexts are different from the original 
ciphertext and it is impossible to retrieve the original ciphertext from the 
photon-limited ciphertext due to PC Poisson nonlinear transformation. It is 
noteworthy that in order to ensure high security, the number of photons per 
pixel should be controlled at a low value. In this case, the photon-limited 
ciphertext would be a very sparse distribution, which is different from the 
distribution of original ciphertext. 
In the proposed method, the object is reconstructed by using 
conventional correlation method [Eqs. (5.4) and (5.5)] followed by 
authentication. In fact, many other reconstruction methods, such as differential 
ghost imaging [127] and normalized ghost imaging [128], can be used to 
produce a higher-contrast object. In these cases, less number of measurements 
or less number of photons can be used to reconstruct a noisy object for 
authentication. 
 
5.3   Summary 
In this chapter, a ghost imaging system using PC for optical encryption is 
proposed. The ghost imaging system is used to encrypt an object generating an 
intensity vector. PC technique is applied to the encrypted distribution 
generating a sparse encrypted data. This procedure provides substantial 





By correlating the sparse encrypted data with the intensity patterns generated 
from the correct phase keys, the object can be decrypted. Nonlinear correlation 
algorithms can be used to authenticate the decoded object. Moreover, object 
retrieval can also be achieved when sufficient numbers of measurements and 
photons are present. An additional layer of protection is provided by the PC 
Poisson nonlinear transformation and would improve the robustness of ghost-








CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 
6.1   Conclusions 
The main objectives of this thesis are to develop new optical image encryption 
techniques for information security, and to overcome the existing problems in 
conventional cryptosystems. The main conclusions drawn from the research 
work in this thesis are summarized as follows: 
           (1) To improve the DRPE technique, a multiple image encryption 
system which overcomes the vulnerability of the conventional DRPE is 
proposed. The images are first compressed to a much smaller signal in a sparse 
domain and the sampled signals of all the images are integrated into one single 
encrypted signal. The integrated cipher text is further encrypted using the 
DRPE technique. A novel method to obtain a sampling operator which is 
unique for every image is proposed. A space multiplexing concept is used to 
exploit the redundant space made available due to the compressive sensing 
process. It is shown that the proposed method is able to encrypt as many as 25 
images with good correlation. Binary masks are used for space multiplexing to 
integrate various sampled data into one single image. This process which 
results in additional key space further increases the security of the proposed 
system. 
(2) To avoid an interferometric scheme in conventional photon-





optical image encryption technique based on PC-DRPE without recording the 
phase is proposed. Although, more photons are needed in the encryption 
process compared to PC-DRPE with known phase technique, the encrypted 
image of the proposed method is just a photon-limited amplitude data that can 
be directly registered by a PC detector and the encryption procedure is thus 
extremely simplified. The decryption process is also simplified since time-
consuming iterative algorithms are not required during decryption. Both 
amplitude-based encryption and full-phase encryption are investigated. The 
results show that the full-phase encryption requires fewer photons for 
authentication than the amplitude-based encryption for a binary image. 
(3) On the security of asymmetric cryptosystems, an improved method 
of attack on the PTFT-based asymmetric cryptosystem using a median-
filtering-based phase retrieval algorithm is proposed. With the proposed 
method of attack, an attacker is able to access the exact decryption keys and 
obtain precise results with only a few iterations. Numerically simulated results 
have validated the effectiveness as well as robustness of the proposed method 
against noise- and occlusion- contaminations. Compared with existing attacks, 
the performance of the proposed method is very much enhanced: (1) exact 
information of the original image can be obtained in gray-scale and binary 
forms; (2) better computing efficiency; (3) more robust against noise and 
occlusion contaminations. Based on the proposed method of attack, a new and 
improved cryptosystem, which does not entail the use of truncated phases 
required in the PTFT-based asymmetric cryptosystem, is further proposed. 
(4) In addition to the PTFT-based asymmetric cryptosystem, the EMD-





based on a phase retrieval algorithm. Employing the proposed method of 
attack, an attacker is able to access the exact decryption keys and obtain 
precise results with only a few iterations. In view of the vulnerability of the 
asymmetric cryptosystem, an asymmetric cryptosystem based on a random 
decomposition technique and a 4-f optical system with good security 
enhancement is proposed. The proposed enhancement is able to achieve high 
resistance against various types of attack while maintaining the asymmetric 
characteristics of the cryptosystem. Numerical simulations have shown the 
proposed method to be feasible with high security. 
(5) A novel optical image authentication scheme by integrating PC 
technique and ghost imaging is proposed. A sparse encrypted data is generated, 
and the decoded object cannot be visually recognized. Nonlinear correlation 
algorithms can be used to authenticate the decoded object. This procedure 
would make it possible to overcome the vulnerability of the ghost-imaging-
based security system to intruder attacks by rendering the encryption process 
nonlinear. Even though the integration of PC technique and ghost imaging is 
mainly intended for information verification, retrieval of the original object 
can also be achieved when sufficient numbers of measurements and photons 
are present. It is expected that more studies can further explore the ghost 
imaging system using PC technique for other applications. 
 
6.2   Future work 
The research work in this thesis has contributed significantly to the field of 
optical image encryption for information security, and has also overcome 





research work also opens up new research areas in optical image encryption 
for information security. It is recommended that some future work can be 
carried out based on this thesis to develop new techniques. Specifically, the 
following issues can be further investigated. 
(1) An encryption method based on PC-DRPE without recording the 
phase is proposed. It is expected that the proposed method can provide an 
effective and promising alternative for information authentication and more 
studies can further explore the properties of PC-DRPE without recording the 
phase. The proposed method may be considered for a variety of optical 
security approaches [129–134]. 
(2) Although many optical techniques are proposed for optical image 
encryption, in most publications only theoretical formulas and numerical 
simulations were implemented due to the lack of experimental facilities. 
Optical image encryption techniques are investigated in this thesis. However, a 
digital device called spatial light modulator is not available in the laboratory, 
so an adequate simulation has been carried out instead. With the availability of 
this device, the techniques proposed in this thesis can be further proven with 
experimental results. 
(3) In conventional DRPE, a holographic scheme is usually applied to 
extract the phase of encrypted image. Although some methods that only need 
to record the amplitude of encrypted image are proposed, these methods have 
not been fully explored. The techniques that only require the amplitude of 
encrypted image can be further studied to avoid a holographic scheme. For 
instance, these methods can also be further studied for the multiple-image 





algorithms can also be explored to enhance the security level or increase the 
number of security keys in optical image encryption, and watermarking 
technique using optical principles can also be investigated.   
(4) An optical image encryption approach by integrating PC technique 
and ghost imaging is proposed. It is expected that more studies can further 
explore the ghost imaging system using PC for other applications. Moreover, 
in addition to PC technique, various signal processing or imaging techniques 
can be studied and further introduced for ghost-imaging-based security system. 
For instance, compressive sensing methods have been extensively investigated 
for various applications, and it can also be modified to be applied to ghost-
imaging-based security system. 
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